|R. v. Scott, convictions for production of marihuana and possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking, pronounced by a Provincial Court judge COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA|
COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA
Judith Anne Scott
On appeal from: Provincial Court of British Columbia, April 23, 2009
Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Madam Justice Neilson:
 The appellant appeals her convictions for production of marihuana and possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking, pronounced by a Provincial Court judge on April 23, 2009. The charges arose from evidence obtained following the execution of a telewarrant by the RCMP on July 19, 2005 at the appellant’s rural property near Princeton, B.C.
 At trial, the appellant contended the search was unlawful, first, because the RCMP failed to meet the requirements for a telewarrant under s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 and, second, because the Information to Obtain a Search Warrant (the “ITO”) did not set out sufficient reliable information to support the issuance of the warrant. Following an extensive voir dire, the trial judge ruled against the appellant on both issues and admitted the evidence seized during the search. The Crown led further evidence on the trial and, at its conclusion, the trial judge found the Crown had established the appellant had knowledge and control of the grow operation and convicted her of both possession and cultivation of marihuana.
 On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial judge’s rulings on the voir dire. She also argues that the verdict was unreasonable and unsupportable on the evidence.
 In September 2004 the Princeton RCMP commenced an investigation into whether there was a marihuana grow operation on the appellant’s property. The investigation was sporadic, and moved through three investigators: Staff Sgt. Lozinski, Cst. Kelly, and Cst. Jarvis, who ultimately prepared the ITO. At the time, Cst. Jarvis was a junior RCMP officer who had recently completed his training.
 The trial judge summarized the investigation as follows:
 Cst. Jarvis took over this file (and a number of others) in April, 2005 when the original investigator, Cst. Kelly, was transferred out of Princeton. Initially he reviewed the Master file, which contained notes of all the RCMP involvement in this matter to that time and noted the following:
1. September 7, 2004
“Cst. Kelly, can you look into this possible grow. Info received from (deleted), who does not want to get involved, that this house has modified their hydro equipment. I had PLP look into this but negative results on by-pass. Just got hydro records and looks like this person has 3 distinct buildings on their property. Possibly a bit high.”
2. December 22, 2004
 After Cst. Jarvis took over responsibility for the file, the following investigation occurred:
3. March 20, 2005
Cst. Jarvis received an anonymous tip from someone who lived in the area. The informant had once previously provided information which information led to a search warrant and a grow operation was located, consistent with the information provided.
This informant told Cst. Jarvis they thought there was a marihuana grow operation at the Scott residence. They had never met or seen the occupants – who like to keep to themselves when it comes to their neighbors. The informant felt it was odd that they have never viewed any traffic coming or going from the residence considering there are two possible places of residence, and a shed on the property capable of holding large equipment including vehicles.
4. June 6, 2005
Cst. Jarvis conducted surveillance of the address. He did not detect the smell of marihuana at that time nor did he see evidence of any illegal activity.
5. June 16, 2005
Cst. Jarvis did a property record check to determine the legal description and ownership. The sole registered owner for the property came back as Judith Scott.
6. June 27, 2005
7. July 4, 2005
8. July 16, 2005
9. Hydro records were monitored
 Cst. Jarvis prepared the ITO on the basis of the information obtained during the investigation and, on July 19, 2005, applied for a telewarrant on the understanding that “there is no Justice of the Peace in Princeton”.
 The RCMP executed the warrant later that day. They searched three buildings on the property: a mobile home in which the appellant resided, a cabin in which her brother lived with his family, and a large shed that was divided in two. The appellant gave the officers the key to one side of the shed and as soon as they opened the door they could smell marihuana. That side housed the appellant’s vehicle and some tools, as well as plant pots, tubing, and watering equipment. The appellant did not have a key to the other side of the shed so the police entered it by force. There they found 13 mature marihuana plants, 583 marihuana clones, over 8,500 grams of dried marihuana, and an assortment of detritus and equipment associated with the grow operation. They also discovered written growing instructions pinned to the wall and on a clipboard. Expert evidence placed the potential value of the grow operation at between $126,245 and $229,505, depending on how it was marketed.
 When the police searched the appellant’s trailer they found receipts for chemicals and fertilizer used for the grow operation, as well as a copy of the growing instructions located in the shed.
 The appellant gave a statement to the police in which she said she had lived on the property for ten years, and had rented the part of the shed with the marihuana grow to a “friend of a friend” a year and a half before. She said she had a suspicion as to who operated the grow, but was afraid to provide information that might identify that person. She said she was frequently away from the property, visiting her boyfriend in Alaska. She stated she had no idea how documents related to the grow operation got into her trailer, but said she had to take responsibility as it was her property and she should have known what was going on.
Proceedings and decision on the voir dire
 The parties agreed a voir dire was appropriate and that the Crown would call the police witnesses and examine them in chief before the appellant’s counsel cross-examined them. Four police officers testified in this manner.
 The appellant challenged the telewarrant, and mounted a broad attack on the ITO, alleging it contained meaningless bald assertions, errors, omissions, and misrepresentations. Significantly, these allegations were based on Cst. Jarvis’ lack of experience and the failure of senior officers to properly supervise him, not on intentional misrepresentation or bad faith.
 The trial judge dismissed the challenge to the telewarrant. She found Cst. Jarvis had an honest belief that there was no justice available in Princeton, there was no evidence to contradict that, and the remoteness of Princeton and infrequent attendance of judges there combined to defeat the application to quash the warrant on this basis.
 As to the ITO, the trial judge corrected two inconsequential errors in dates. As well, she excised several paragraphs that wrongly suggested the appellant’s sister-in-law, who also lived on the property, had a record related to a marihuana grow operation. She also deleted a paragraph that set out the economic circumstances of the property’s residents as misleading and unsupported by the evidence.
 The trial judge found unwarranted omissions in the ITO. Notably, it did not record the inconclusive FLIR procedure conducted on December 22, 2004. Nor did it record the failure of police to detect the odour of marihuana on their visits to or near the property prior to July 16, 2005. She, however, characterized these omissions as having only minor significance.
 As to the contention that Cst. Jarvis was inexperienced and inadequately supervised, the trial judge found he did make inadvertent errors that a more experienced officer probably would not have made. She decided, however, that the manner in which the ITO came to be in the form in which it was presented to the justice was irrelevant in the absence of bad faith or intent to mislead on the part of Cst. Jarvis or his supervisors, and she found no evidence to support such a contention.
 After completing her review of the appellant’s multi-pronged attack on the ITO, she stated her conclusion as to its sufficiency at paras. 100-102 of her reasons (I have taken the liberty of correcting some of the formatting in reproducing those paragraphs.):
 After making the technical corrections and excising the material as indicated above, the court is left to consider what remains in the ITO. It is:
1. The tip that Sgt. Lozinski originally received that there was a marihuana grow operation at the property and the source had personally seen modified hydro equipment. Submissions were made about the fact that a Hydro by-pass was not found at the property as the source alleged. What the tipster reported was “modified equipment”, not a bypass. Cst. Jarvis gave evidence that there was a “modification” in place when the warrant was executed. On page 48 of the transcript of May 10, 2007 at line 41, Cst. Jarvis testified as follows:
Q. Were there any modifications to the power system?
Q. What had occurred?
A. There was a line run from the cabin off their hydro box through a water hose that led briefly under the ground and up into the garage shed where the grow op was found.
Therefore this tip turned out to be very accurate.
2. The tip received by Cst. Jarvis that there was a grow operation on the property. That source indicated there were two residences and a shed on the property capable of holding large equipment. This was an accurate description of the property and the source had previously provided accurate information to the police.
3. The information from Cst. Stus and Cst. Jarvis’ opinion that what Cst. Stus saw was consistent with a grow operation.
4. The information that Judith Scott owned the property. She had no entries on CPIC or PIRS.
5. Cst. Jarvis’ surveillance on June 6, 2005 and his description of what he saw and his knowledge of details of marihuana grow operations.
6. Cst. Jarvis’ surveillance on July 16, 2005 and the fact he smelt marihuana coming from the property on that date.
7. The Hydro records that show unusual consumption of electricity for the property itself and as compared with other properties.
8. Reference to knowledge about marihuana grow operations that Cst. Jarvis has obtained through experience and discussions with other drug investigators.
 Turning to those items that were left out of the ITO which I have found should have been included, I find that the omission of those items would not cause the Justice to be misled and there was no bad faith by any of the officers which caused the omissions.
 Taking all of this into consideration, I find that Constable Jarvis did set out reasonably accurately, if not perfectly, his investigation into the matter up to the time of applying for the warrant and that the manner in which he did so did not leave a false impression of the facts. Applying the standard of review required, I find the ITO was sufficient for a justice to issue the warrant.
 Having found the warrant was valid and the evidence from the search was admissible, the trial judge declined to embark on an analysis under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
Issues on appeal
 The appellant advances three grounds of appeal:
1. Did the trial judge err in finding the preconditions for issuing a telewarrant pursuant to s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code had been met?
2. Did the trial judge err in finding that the ITO, as amplified on review, contained sufficient reliable information to support the search warrant?
3. Was the verdict reasonable and supported on the evidence?
 Before turning to those issues, I will address a further complaint by the appellant that, while not a ground of appeal, she describes as “an over-arching concern” animating her first two grounds of appeal. She complains the procedure followed in the voir dire was inappropriate and potentially prejudicial to her interests.
 The appellant says the voir dire was conducted in the same manner as that which attracted criticism from this Court in R. v. Wilson, 2011 BCCA 252, 272 C.C.C. (3d) 269, a case decided since the trial of this matter. Mr. Justice Frankel, writing for the Court, noted at paras. 61-69 there had been no “Vukelich hearing” at the outset to determine whether the accused met the threshold for holding a voir dire. Nor had the defence sought leave to cross-examine the affiant in compliance with the procedures established in R. v. Garofoli,  2 S.C.R. 1421 at 1465, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 161. Instead, the parties, apparently without intervention by the Court, agreed the Crown would examine the investigating officer before the defence conducted its cross-examination. Mr. Justice Frankel found this wrested control of the voir dire process from the trial judge, and wrongly permitted the Crown to bolster or correct the ITO in the first instance, rather than having the ITO stand as the informant’s evidence-in-chief. The proper procedure requires the defence to first conduct its cross-examination, and any questioning by the Crown should be limited to re-examination on matters raised by the defence.
 I agree the procedure followed in this case was inappropriate. I am not convinced, however, that this had a bearing on the findings of the trial judge. The appellant has not identified any evidence elicited by the Crown in its evidence-in-chief that would have been impermissible re-examination. Nor has she demonstrated the irregular procedure led to improper amplification of the officers’ evidence or other unfairness that operated to her detriment.
Did the trial judge err in finding the preconditions for issuing a telewarrant pursuant to s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code had been met?
 Section 487.1 of the Code requires a peace officer submitting a request for a telewarrant to establish it was impracticable to appear personally before a justice to obtain the warrant. Section 487.1(4)(a) requires the officer to include in the ITO “a statement of the circumstances that make it impracticable”. Here, Cst. Jarvis sought to fulfill that requirement by stating “there is no Justice of the Peace in Princeton”.
 At the voir dire, Cst. Jarvis testified he knows he is supposed to make sure there is no justice available locally before requesting a telewarrant, and he accomplishes this by routinely checking a board posted in the RCMP detachment that records dates on which the Provincial Court sits in Princeton for criminal and traffic matters. He conceded he did not specifically remember checking the board in this case but said he was confident he had done so as that has always been his practice. He agreed he did not call the courthouse to see if court was sitting because he understood that would be listed on the board. He acknowledged that sitting dates for family court and small claims court were not on the board, but said he understood those were the same as regular court days. He said he did not know he had to make further inquiries beyond checking the board.
 The defence conceded there was no justice available in Princeton on July 19, 2005.
 In considering this point, the trial judge observed the closest resident judge was located in Penticton, 112 km away, and the Provincial Court sat in Princeton only several days each month. She concluded:
 In the case at bar, I find that Cst. Jarvis honestly believed there wasn’t a Judge or a Justice of the Peace available in Princeton on July 19, 2005 and there is no evidence before the Court that there was in fact a Justice available.
 Given the honestly held belief of Cst. Jarvis, the factual situation with respect to the remoteness of Princeton from resident Judges and Justices of the Peace and the infrequent scheduling of their attendance to Princeton, taken together with the purpose of the Telewarrant provisions, the application to quash the warrant on this basis is dismissed.
 The appellant argues, first, that the trial judge erred in finding that Cst. Jarvis’ inquiries were sufficient to establish the requirement of impracticability.
 Whether it was impracticable to appear before a justice personally is a finding of fact. The trial judge accepted that Cst. Jarvis honestly believed that no justice was available in Princeton on July 19, 2005. Counsel’s concession established that was in fact true. I see nothing objectionable in permitting a trial judge, who sits regularly in the region, to take judicial notice of the geographic circumstances of the community. This accords with the common sense approach endorsed in R. v. Erickson, 2003 BCCA 693 at paras. 29-34, 19 C.R. (6th) 367. I conclude the trial judge made no error in finding the requirement of impracticability was established.
 The appellant next argues the trial judge erred in finding Cst. Jarvis’ statement in the ITO was sufficient to satisfy s. 487.1(4)(a), and in permitting inappropriate amplification by the Crown in reaching that conclusion. She relies on R. v. Ling, 2009 BCCA 70 at paras. 25-27, 241 C.C.C. (3d) 409, in which this Court upheld the trial judge’s decision to quash a telewarrant where the ITO stated it was impracticable to appear personally “because there is no available Justice locally”. Mr. Justice Bauman, writing for the Court, noted the officer had made no inquiry as to the availability of a justice in Grand Forks, and made no effort to explain in the ITO why it was impracticable to travel to one of several nearby communities to appear in person before a justice who might have been present there. He found this was fatal to the telewarrant. He distinguished this case from others in which the officers’ affidavits made it clear there were no justices ever present in their respective communities.
 This Court considered a similar situation in R. v. Smith, 2005 BCCA 334 at paras. 40-47, 199 C.C.C. (3d) 404. In applying for a telewarrant, a peace officer in Sidney stated that applying personally was impracticable because “local justice not available”. On the voir dire, he testified that he had been told that justices only worked out of a centre in Vancouver and so he understood one was not available in Victoria to sign a search warrant. Madam Justice Ryan found the bare assertion in the ITO was insufficient. In doing so, she distinguished the circumstances from those in R. v. Berry, 2002 BCSC 1742. There, Mr. Justice Edwards found a statement that “there is no Justice of the Peace in the community before whom I may appropriately make this application in person”, made by an officer in Gibsons, was sufficient. Madam Justice Ryan found the distinction lay in the fact the statement in Berry went beyond simply saying a justice was unavailable, and made it clear there was no justice in the community.
 While Madam Justice Ryan considered the trial decision in R. v. Erickson, 2002 BCSC 785, it appears that neither she nor Mr. Justice Bauman in Ling were referred to this Court’s decision in that case. There, a peace officer in Kimberley stated in the ITO that he sought a telewarrant “because there is no local J.P. services available”. The evidence disclosed the nearest justice was 30 km away in Cranbrook. Madam Justice Saunders, writing for the Court, agreed the trial judge, whose judicial seat was in Cranbrook, was entitled to take judicial notice of the fact that Kimberley and Cranbrook were separated by rugged unorganized territory. She interpreted “impracticable” as importing a large measure of common sense, and found no basis on which to interfere with the trial judge’s conclusion that the officer’s statement met the requirements of s. 487.1.
 Finally, in R. v. Farewell, 2006 BCSC 372, a junior officer in Trail applying for a telewarrant stated it was impracticable to apply personally because “there are no Judicial Justices of the Peace or Judges available”. On the voir dire, the officer testified she understood that in the Trail detachment it was common knowledge justices were not available and the policy was to apply for telewarrants. As a result, she had made no inquiries as to the availability of justices in nearby communities. There was no evidence as to whether a justice would have been available in one of those communities. The trial judge held that the officer’s failure to make inquires was relevant when considering the sufficiency of the words used to communicate the impracticability of appearing in person:
 Within this latter query, it is relevant, in my view, whether the evidence on the amplified review establishes that the officer automatically followed “boilerplate” wording or whether the words actually reflect informed knowledge. In the case before me, the words were standard, and would be used for every warrant in the Trail detachment because it was their policy to assume unavailability and to make no inquiries, despite the directive requiring an inquiry to be made. Even allowing for the possible futility of repeated phone calls to registries where JJP’s rarely appear, there was no evidence before me that the detachment had a schedule of traffic court sittings or any other information that would allow an officer to determine when a JJP might be in the area. Cst. McAuley herself had no particular knowledge of the availability of the justices or judges, and made no effort to inquire about it. I do not suggest that she did not honestly believe what she wrote; however, she had, in practical terms, no way of knowing if the words were true or not.
 In other circumstances, depending on the evidence that is available on the amplified review as to the state of knowledge of the affiant and the basis for it, these very words might be sufficient, but in the circumstances here they are not. They do not properly inform the authorizing justice as to the reasonableness of the officer’s belief, which is an essential prerequisite for issuing a telewarrant, because the officer who provided the information had no knowledge, personal or otherwise, as to whether the statement that it was impracticable to appear in person was accurate or not.
 The trial judge quashed the warrant but decided the evidence found during the search should be admitted pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter. An appeal of her decision was limited to the trial judge’s s. 24(2) analysis: 2008 BCCA 9.
 Here, the trial judge made no express finding on the requirement in s. 487.1(4)(a), but it is implicit in her reasons that she found Cst. Jarvis’ statement “there is no Justice of the Peace in Princeton” sufficiently complied with that provision. I am satisfied she made no error in reaching that conclusion.
 While there is some diversity in the authorities I have set out, I believe it is fair to say they indicate a bald statement as to the unavailability of a justice will not suffice as a statement of the circumstances creating impracticability. There must be something more to permit the issuing justice to assess the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that an application for a warrant in the usual course is impracticable. These decisions also suggest, however, that this requirement may be met by a statement that establishes there are no justices available in the community where the officer is posted. Moreover, as set out previously, I see nothing objectionable in the issuing justice or, later, the reviewing justice, taking judicial notice of concrete local circumstances in assessing the adequacy of the officer’s statement.
 On that basis, I am satisfied Cst. Jarvis’ statement was facially sufficient to satisfy s. 487.1(4)(a). The appellant’s attempts to diminish that statement through amplification were unsuccessful. Instead, the evidence indicated Cst. Jarvis undertook inquiries about the availability of a justice and his statement as to impracticability was not simply boilerplate. While I agree with the appellant that evidence cannot be used to strengthen the Crown’s position, it does serve to distinguish this case from the situations in Ling and Farewell, where the accused were able to rely on amplification to demonstrate a failure to comply with s. 487.1(4)(a).
 I conclude there is no merit in the appellant’s attack on the validity of the telewarrant.
Did the trial judge err in finding that the ITO, as amplified on review, contained sufficient reliable information to support the search warrant?
 The appellant mounts a broad attack on the ITO and the trial judge’s findings as to its sufficiency. She maintains an examination of the ITO reveals multiple significant defects, including material non-disclosure, careless and misleading drafting, and unfounded and subjective opinions and assertions of Cst. Jarvis. She says these deficiencies are compounded by the failure of the RCMP to provide proper supervision of this inexperienced officer. The appellant argues the trial judge erred in failing to appreciate the significance of these defects, and in her assessment of their impact, as revealed by proper amplification. She says when these factors are properly examined in their totality it is clear the ITO did not set out reasonable grounds supporting the issuance of the warrant. The ensuing search of her property was therefore an unlawful violation of her rights under s. 8 of the Charter, and the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence obtained from it.
 The question of whether the justice could have issued a warrant on the ITO as properly amplified involves the application of a legal standard to the grounds set out in the ITO, and is a question of law to be determined on a standard of correctness on appellate review: R. v. Vu, 2011 BCCA 536 at para. 35.
 Before turning to the appellant’s arguments, I find it useful to set out the principles governing the review of whether a search warrant was properly issued, established in Garofoli and R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65,  2 S.C.R. 992. I adopt Mr. Justice Donald’s statement of these in R. v. Bacon, 2010 BCCA 135 at para. 25, 285 B.C.A.C. 108, leave to appeal ref’d  S.C.C.A. No. 213:
The trial judge’s role in reviewing the validity of a search warrant is to consider whether the material filed in support of the warrant, as amplified on review, could support the issuance of the warrant. While evidence of fraud, material non-disclosure, or misleading information are all relevant to this enquiry, their sole impact is to determine whether there is a continuing basis to support the warrant: ...
 I observe that the appellant’s position at trial and on appeal did not go so far as to allege deliberate fraud or non-disclosure. Her allegations are instead rooted in Cst. Jarvis’ inexperience, and the failure of senior constables to adequately supervise his investigation and preparation of the ITO. In that context, I note errors in an ITO need not be intentionally misleading to have an impact on its sufficiency: R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 at para. 59,  1 S.C.R. 253.
 As to amplification, on the voir dire before a reviewing judge, an accused may lead evidence to generally support the challenge to the ITO, whereas the Crown is restricted to amplification directed to the correction of minor or technical errors made in good faith and derived from information available to the police at the time the warrant issued. The Crown may not rely on amplification to effectively provide a retroactive authorization that circumvents the requirement to obtain approval for the warrant prior to the search: Araujo at paras. 54-59; Morelli at paras. 41-43.
 Ultimately, the reviewing judge must examine the record submitted to the authorizing justice, including any exclusions and additions arising from proper amplification on review, and decide whether on a “practical, non-technical, and common sense basis” the totality of the circumstances demonstrate reasonable grounds for the belief the appellant was committing the stated offences, and could support the issuance of a warrant: R. v. Wilson, 2011 BCCA 252 at para. 52, 272 C.C.C. (3d) 269; R. v. Saunders, 2003 NLCA 63, 181 C.C.C. (3d) 268 at para. 15, aff’d  3 S.C.R. 505.
 I turn to consideration of each of the appellant’s challenges to the ITO.
1. The information from Source A – paragraphs 3 and 4 of the ITO
 Sgt. Lozinski instigated the investigation when he received a tip from Source A. Cst. Jarvis set out these events at paragraphs 3 and 4 of the ITO:
3. THAT, 7th September, 2004, SGT. LOZINSKI a member of the Princeton RCMP received information from an anonymous source of unknown reliability (Now known as source “A”), that there is a marihuana grow operation at the address of 2493 Princeton-Summerland Road (Hwy# 40), Princeton, B.C. The source stating that he had personally observed modified hydro equipment at the property consistent with excessive use of hydro and grow-operations. That source “A” claims he is personally familiar with grow-operations and grow equipment which is what lead him to believe there is a grow-operation at this residence.
4. THAT on that date SGT. LOZINSKI started a Grow-operation file under 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for further investigation. That, that file was turned over to CST. KELLY for investigation and then on April 20, 2005 to me after I received further information.
 The appellant argues the trial judge erred by relying on those paragraphs to support the warrant. First, he says the evidence on amplification demonstrated Cst. Jarvis misreported the information from Source A in a manner that wrongly strengthened it. The source did not tell Sgt. Lozinski he was personally familiar with grow operations. As well, Cst. Jarvis did not disclose that Sgt. Lozinski attempted to corroborate the tip by obtaining records from Princeton Light and Power for the property, but found nothing in those to support a power bypass or a grow operation. Instead, he assessed the power consumption by the three users on the property as only “possibly a bit high”. The appellant says the trial judge should have excised both paragraphs from the ITO due to these omissions.
 The trial judge considered and rejected this argument, stating:
 I find that paragraph (3) of the ITO accurately states the details of the tip received, including the fact that it is from a source of unknown reliability. Paragraph (4) of the ITO states that a file was opened as a result of the initial information.
 Reading paragraphs (3) and (4) together, I find the Justice would not have been misled due to the lack of inclusion of the preliminary work done by Sgt. Lozinski. Taking all of the information that was included in the ITO, Cst. Jarvis’ failure to include part of the memo does not affect the sufficiency of the ITO nor would the omission of this particular information have misled the Justice.
 While the steps taken by Sgt. Lozinski should have been more accurately and completely set out in the ITO, I am not persuaded the trial judge erred in finding these errors of little significance in assessing the information from this source. They dealt with information obtained at the outset of a ten-month investigation, and subsequent steps had greater import in determining whether reasonable and probable grounds for a warrant existed. Having said that, I will return to the omission of Sgt. Lozinski’s interpretation of the electrical consumption when I deal with Cst. Jarvis’ assessment of that factor in the ITO.
 The appellant raises a second and more forceful objection to the trial judge’s reliance on Source A. She says the trial judge erred in failing to consider the information from this source in accordance with the principles in R. v. Debot,  2 S.C.R. 1140, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193 and Garofoli. At 1168 of Debot, the Court set out three factors to consider in deciding whether information from an anonymous source is reliable: whether the information regarding commission of a crime is compelling, whether the source is credible, and whether the information provided was corroborated by police investigation before deciding to conduct the search. Here, the information from Source A may have been compelling, but nothing was known of the source’s credibility or reliability, and the tip was not corroborated until the search itself revealed modifications to the power system on the appellant’s property. The appellant correctly points out the results of the search cannot provide ex post facto evidence of an informant’s reliability: Garofoli at 1457.
 I agree the trial judge erred in judging the tip from Source A to be “very accurate” on the basis of information obtained from the search. In the absence of anything else to corroborate or commend the reliability of the tip, it had little value in deciding whether a justice could have issued the ITO.
2. Non-disclosure of Cst. Kelly’s FLIR investigation of December 22, 2004, and of his failure to detect the odour of marihuana
 On December 22, 2004 Cst. Kelly conducted a FLIR investigation with inconclusive results. As well, he reported he did not detect the smell of marihuana at the property during this investigation. These observations were not set out in the ITO. On the voir dire, Cst. Jarvis was asked about his failure to include them and said he did not think the FLIR was relevant because the results were inconclusive. He agreed, however, that with hindsight Cst. Kelly’s observations should have been reported in the ITO.
 At trial, the appellant argued this omission represented a material non-disclosure. The trial judge, at paragaph 57 of her reasons, agreed the information should have been included, but found it would have had only slight relevance to the authorizing justice since a great deal of further information was gathered in the intervening months before Cst. Jarvis applied for the ITO.
 I agree with that assessment, and add the following since the failure to detect the odour of marihuana arises again on other aspects of the ITO. In my view, that is a neutral finding in most circumstances. While some authorities have been critical of the police for failing to report neutral findings in an ITO, I am persuaded that view, insofar as it pertains to the failure to detect the odour of marihuana, has been put to rest by this Court’s decision in R. v. Readhead, 2008 BCCA 193. There, a police officer went to the appellant’s house every two weeks over the 14-month investigation in an attempt to gain grounds to seek a search warrant. He smelled marihuana on only one of those visits, and detected nothing else that suggested the presence of a grow operation. The ITO set out only the officer’s findings on that one occasion. Mr. Justice Lowry, writing for the Court, upheld the trial judge’s finding that, while the odour of marihuana is a positive sign that a grow operation exists, the absence of such an odour, or other incriminating evidence, is a neutral fact, dependant on many variables, and does not suggest there is no marihuana grow operation. Mr. Justice Lowry stated:
 The appellant argues further the investigating officer’s failure to disclose the full extent of his investigation should in itself have resulted in the warrant being set aside because the constitutional protection the procedure for obtaining it ensures was thwarted. The justice of the peace was not given the basis or platform for a neutral, detached, reasoned balancing of the competing interests involved. But once it is accepted what was not disclosed was neutral, in the sense it did not negate the existence of a grow operation, any concern there might be in this regard must fall away. I am unable to accept what appear to be statements to the contrary in R. v. Witter 2003 BCSC 1977, R. v. Newton, 2003 BCSC 1197, and R. v. Hallman, 2001 BCSC 1355 to which we were referred.
 I conclude the trial judge made no error in her assessment of these omissions in the ITO.
3. The information from Source B – paragraphs 5 and 6 of the ITO
 Cst. Jarvis set out the information from Source B in these terms in the ITO:
5. THAT on 20th April, 2005 I also received information from an anonymous source, of unknown reliability (Now known as Source “B”) that there is a marihuana grow operation at the address of 2493 Princeton-Summerland Road (Hwy# 40) Princeton, B.C. That the source stated that they live in the area of 2493 Hwy #40 (Princeton-Summerland Rd.) That they have never met nor seen the occupants. That the occupants like to keep to themselves when it comes to their neighbors and that it is odd that they have never viewed any traffic coming or going from the residence considering there are two possible places of residence and a shed on the property capable of holding large equipment including vehicles.
6. THAT source “B” has given verified information to this officer on one occasion that led to a search warrant and the arrest of an individual now charged with Production of Marihuana and Possession for the purposes of Trafficking. This information given on April 20, 2005 (File # 2004-2662)
 The appellant argues that information alone was incapable of supporting the warrant. The tip was simply a bald conclusion that was never corroborated.
 There is nothing in the judge’s reasons to suggest the appellant challenged these paragraphs on the voir dire. She simply noted the source had previously provided accurate information to the police, and had correctly described the buildings on the property.
 Assessing this information in the context of the three criteria in Debot, the information provided was compelling to the extent that the source lived in the area, and stated there was a marihuana grow operation on the appellant’s property, although the balance of the observations were neutral. The source had demonstrated reliability on a previous occasion, correctly identifying circumstances that led to charges. As well, the information provided by the source was corroborated before the warrant was executed when Cst. Jarvis detected the smell of marihuana on July 16, 2005.
 I am satisfied the trial judge was entitled to rely on these paragraphs in determining the sufficiency of the ITO.
4. Cst. Jarvis’ report of information obtained from Cst. Stus on June 27, 2005 – paragraphs 7 to 10 of the ITO
 On June 27, 2005 Cst. Stus visited the appellant’s property to advise the residents there had been a break and enter in the neighbourhood, and to see if they had seen anything suspicious. On his return, he reported his observations to Cst. Jarvis, who described them as follows in the ITO:
7. THAT, Constable Myrl STUS of the Princeton RCMP attended by the residence at 2493 Princeton-Summerland Road Princeton, B.C. conducting neighbourhood inquiries on a Break and Enter at a neighbouring residence. That as he drove up he observed a trailer with no observable occupants or vehicles, a large drive shed capable of holding a semi-truck that had an unlicensed truck parked directly out front, that it had been there for quite a while, as long grass had grown up around it.
8. THAT as he drove up to the residence a small log cabin, two large rottweiler dogs started to bark at his vehicle. That a woman and a man exited the house and met him before he could exit his police vehicle.
9. THAT CST. STUS thought this property and its residence to be suspicious:
A: Firstly, that it is known that drug dealers and grow-operators employ the help of large dogs like Rottweilers to protect their drugs and keep people off their property.
B: Second, that the large shed appeared to be new, but not in use, as a vehicle was parked outside of the doors to the shed for an obviously long time as long grass could be seen growing around it. That these buildings are very expensive to build. The house that they were living in was in need of repair and appeared to be neglected. That it is known that grow-operators will build large expensive buildings to grow their drugs in, while neglecting other parts of the property trying to maximise profits.
C: That upon the couple hearing the dogs barking they both exited the house and met the police car before he could exit the police vehicle. That grow-operators use the dogs as early warning systems. That they do this to avoid anyone going near the residence where they may detect the odour of marihuana or see evidence of a grow operation.
10. THAT upon return to the detachment CST. STUS relayed the information stated above to me unknowing that I had an open grow-operation investigation on the residence and its occupants.
 The appellant argues the trial judge erred in relying on those paragraphs because they presented a selective, prejudicial, and inaccurate account of Cst. Stus’ visit to the appellant’s property. She says that Cst. Jarvis presented only those observations that he felt were consistent with a grow operation, and did not ask Cst. Stus if he had smelled marihuana or seen any indication of drug production during his visit. Cst. Stus testified at the voir dire that he had not, and the appellant says that information should have been obtained and included in the ITO. He also argues that Cst. Jarvis failed to disclose Cst. Stus’ observation that both residences on the property were occupied, and says this would have been relevant to the interpretation of electrical consumption.
 As to the last point, at paragraphs 59-61 of her reasons the trial judge found that additional information about the occupants of the buildings was unnecessary as other parts of the ITO made it clear there were two residences and separate hydro metres for each. I agree with that comment.
 As to the failure to disclose that Cst. Stus failed to detect evidence of marihuana on the property, the trial judge stated:
 The Defence argues that the fact that Cst. Stus didn’t notice any smell or unusual venting should have been in the ITO. Cst. Stus testified that his only reason for attending this property was a follow-up to a nearby break and enter and at the time, he had no idea that the property was the subject of a marihuana production investigation. Therefore he would have had no reason to check for these items.
 I have some difficulty with the judge’s final observation in that paragraph. At the voir dire, Cst. Stus testified that he made the observations set out in the ITO because he thought the property could be “potentially a place to grow marihuana”, and agreed he would have recorded any odour of marihuana or other indication of a grow operation on the property. It therefore seems certain Cst. Stus would have noticed the smell of marihuana if it existed, regardless of the purpose of his visit.
 I earlier expressed the view that the failure to detect such an odour is, in most circumstances, a neutral factor. I view this situation as an exception to that statement. I am persuaded that in crafting these paragraphs, Cst. Jarvis was selective in seeking and reporting the information potentially available from Cst. Stus. He set out Cst. Stus’ observations that might be consistent with marihuana production, even though many of these could also be interpreted as neutral. He did not ask Cst. Stus about, or report, other neutral observations that would be inconsistent with that activity.
 In her assessment of the ITO, the trial judge relied on “the information from Cst. Stus and Cst. Jarvis’ opinion that what he saw was consistent with a grow operation”. I am persuaded that conclusion failed to recognize the limited nature of Cst. Stus’ observations. As well, many of the observations set out in paragraphs 7 to 9 of the ITO were equally compatible with innocent activity. In my view, the trial judge should have placed little weight on Cst. Stus’ observations in assessing the sufficiency of the ITO.
5. Cst. Jarvis’ surveillance of the appellant’s property on June 6 and July 16, 2005, and related knowledge – paragraphs 17 to 21 of the ITO
 In finding the ITO sufficient, the trial judge relied on Cst. Jarvis’ observations of the property on these dates, as well as “his knowledge of details of marihuana grow operations”, set out in paragraphs 17-21 of the ITO:
17. THAT, on the 06th day of June, 2005, at 1000 hours, I conducted surveillance of 2493 Princeton-Summerland Road, British Columbia, from the public roadway and observed the following:
a. That, 2493 Princeton-Summerland Road, British Columbia, is an overgrow well hidden property that faces West onto Princeton-Summerland Road. There are no houses near or immediately bordering the residence.
b. That, the address 2493 Princeton-Summerland Road Princeton, B.C. is clearly displayed on the entrance way to the driveway out in front of the residence.
c. That, the GPS readings for the property are
18. THAT, as a result of speaking with experienced drug investigators, as well as based on my own experience, I have found that it is very common for Cannabis Marihuana to be grown indoors. As a result, I have found that in order to grow marihuana indoors, high intensity discharge lamps, usually 1000 watt lamps or similar wattage, are required in order to simulate the effects of the natural sun.
19. THAT, in order to grow healthy indoor marihuana plants, the grower has to provide a fresh air supply to the growing environment and exhaust the stale air and excess oxygen from the grow rooms, otherwise the grower risks losing the crop. This often results in the detectable odour of growing marihuana which can sometimes be smelled for quite a distance. This would account for the selection of property being one where the residences are so far back from the road.
20. THAT, due to this detectable odour of growing marihuana, the cultivator will tend to take extra measures to mask the smell. Such measures include the use of ozone generators (to neutralize the odour particles of the marihuana), charcoal air filters, fabric softener sheets and mothballs. It has also been found that the cultivator will sometimes ventilate the excess oxygen through the sewer system by fitting the venting system over the toilet or exhaust through the attic. It is not uncommon for the cultivator to employ all the masking measures at the same time. Although these measures are often taken, the pungent odour of growing marihuana cannot always be neutralized.
21. THAT on July 16, 2005 at 0115 hours I conducted surveillance of 2493 Princeton-Summerland Road, Princeton, B.C. That I stood on the public roadway road way out front of the property and conducted a foot patrol. The wind was blowing in a westerly direction across the property towards the roadway where I was standing. That I could immediately smell the odour of freshly growing marihuana coming from the property. That as I walked up the road to the north away from the property the odour disappeared and as I returned to the front of the property I could smell the odour of freshly growing marihuana again. Also observed is that this property has no direct neighbors verifying to me the smell was coming from 2493 Princeton-Summerland Road, Princeton, B.C.
 The appellant argues that Cst. Jarvis’ descriptions of his observations are misleading and insufficient. First, she says Cst. Jarvis failed to state that he could not detect the odour of marihuana during his visit on June 6, 2005. Second, while he did detect the smell of marihuana on July 16, 2005, he failed to take proper steps to isolate it to the appellant’s property, and did not disclose this in the ITO. In support, the appellant relies on R. v. Oakley, 2002 BCSC 1837, and R. v. Newton, 2003 BCSC 1197, both cases in which the judge criticized the police for failing to disclose that the odour of marihuana from the residence of the accused was only periodic, and for failing to localize the odour to the appellant’s dwelling by any reliable evidence. In each case, the search authorized by the issuing justice was found to be unlawful.
 The trial judge reached these conclusions as to the adequacy of disclosure of odours emanating from the appellant’s property:
 This [the failure to detect the odour of marihuana on June 6, 2005] should have been included in the ITO to provide as full a report as possible about the investigation that had been conducted. However, I am not satisfied that the inclusion of this piece of information would have made a significant difference to the decision of whether or not to issue the warrant. The fact that the officer did not smell marihuana on a previous occasion does not carry much weight given the fact that he did smell it on the date that he applied for the warrant.
 Defence counsel argued that Cst. Jarvis could not be sure that the odour was coming from the Scott property as opposed to [the] neighbouring property. I am satisfied that on the evidence he gave of detecting the smell most strongly from the driveway, with the wind blowing across the Scott property to the driveway, it was reasonable for him to conclude that it was coming from the Scott property.
 As to Cst. Jarvis’ failure to “square” the property by identifying its perimeter and walking around it to isolate the odour, the trial judge accepted Cst. Jarvis’ explanation:
 With respect to the lack of squaring I am satisfied with the officer’s explanation as to why that was not done, namely
 There was an evidentiary foundation for these findings and I discern no basis on which we would be entitled to interfere with them. Further, this Court’s decision in Readhead obviates the decisions relied on by the appellant.
 As to whether the odour detected on July 16, 2005 was adequately isolated to the appellant’s property, there is an evidentiary basis for that finding that the trial judge was entitled to accept.
6. The hydro records – paragraphs 27 to 38 of the ITO
 Cst. Jarvis obtained hydro records detailing power consumption for the three buildings on the appellant’s property. He set out this aspect of his investigation at paragraphs 27-38 of the ITO:
27. THAT by way of the Freedom and Information Act, Hydro consumption records for the address of 2493 Princeton-Summerland Road (Hwy #40), Princeton, BC, which is in the name of Judy SCOTT. Have been monitored since the creation of this file. The records have been consistently high and when compared to the past have doubled and even tripled. This property contains three separate electrical meters. Meter one is for a small trailer on the property. Meter two is for a log cabin that is occupied and meter three is a shop that is on the property.
28. THAT the records for the trailer on the property were as follows. April 2005, 3152 kwh. February 2005, 3657 kwh and December 2005, 2835 kwh.
29. THAT CST. JARVIS, under the Freedom of Information Act applied for the Hydro records of similar residences of the same size at approximately 850 square feet, the readings were as follows:
A: 406 Brandlmayr Gate #16 readings for the same approximate periods were 946 kwh in March 2005 and 1255 kwh in January of 2005.
B: 406 Brandlmayr Gate #28 readings for the same approximate periods were 1086 kwh in March 2005 and 840 in January of 2005.
C: 473 Corina Avenue #29 readings for the same approximate periods were 1183 kwh in March 2005 and 1357 kwh in January of 2005.
30. THAT I compared these readings received from Princeton Light and Power showing an average of 300% more consumption than similar residences. But also that in the other residence as the weather warms up the reading go down because there is less demand for hydro. But the trailer at 2493 Hwy #40 (Princeton-Summerland Road), Princeton, BC, the readings go up.
31. THAT I compared hydros reading from a grow-operation (File # 2004-2662) recently found by Princeton RCMP at a trailer in the same area of 2493 Hwy #40, Princeton, BC, that a search warrant was executed on May 30, 2005. That trailer having a marihuana grow room set up for 5-7 grow lights and able to accommodate up to 100 marihuana plants. This trailer being the same approximate size as the one at 2493 Hwy #40 (Princeton-Summerland Road). The reading from October 22nd, 2004 is 3,070 Kilowatt hours. The reading from December 17th, 2004 is 3,778 Kilowatt hours. And recently April 2005 being 3662 kwh.
32. THAT I compared these readings received from Princeton Light and Power for both trailers showing 2493 Hwy #40 (Princeton-Summerland Road) with similar consumption rates as the grow operation.
33. THAT the hydro records drawn for the house on the property at 2493 Hwy #40 (Princeton-Summerland Road), Princeton, B.C. were as follows. April 2005, 5021 kwh. February 2005, 5627 kwh and December 2005, 4848 kwh.
34. THAT CST. JARVIS under the Freedom of Information Act applied for the Hydro records of a residence the same approximate size as 2493 Princeton-Summerland Road at approximately 2000 square feet, the readings were as follows:
A: 2344 Hwy #40 (Princeton-Summerland Road) Princeton, B.C. April 2005, 725 kwh, February 2005, 1186 kwh and December 2005, 854 kwh.
35. THAT I compared these readings received from Princeton Light and Power showing an average of 300% more consumption than a similar residence. But also that in other residences as the weather warms up the readings go down because there is less demand for hydro. But the house’s hydro readings at 2493 Princeton-Summerland Road (Hwy #40), Princeton, BC, go up.
36. THAT the records for the shop at 2493 Hwy #40 (Princeton- Summerland Road) Princeton, B.C. were as follows. April 2005, 2767 kwh. February 2005, 3023 kwh and December 2005, 2742 kwh. Again in my opinion high consumption records for the type of building. Considering it doesn’t seem to be being used for any outside reason. And the fact that it has its own hydro meter make it hard to compare to anything of that size and configuration.
37. THAT on July 8, 2005 I again under the freedom of information act [sic] applied for the hydro records of 2493 Princeton-Summerland Road those reading being:
June 2005, 3266 kwh for the shop.
June 2005, 4643 kwh for the log cabin.
June 2005, 3210 kwh for the trailer.
38. THAT I compared these reading to the last set of readings in April 2005 to find that power consumption had increased in both the shop and the trailer. That when one considers the warmer weather and the longer days the readings should have decreased as less energy consumption would be used. As the main drawers of energy, heating and lights will be in less demand.
 The trial judge dealt with this information at paragraph 72 of her reasons for judgment. She rejected the appellant’s submission that the ITO did not fairly represent the information in the hydro records:
 The accused submit that what is set out in paragraphs 27 through 38 of the ITO is not a fair representation of the situation with respect to the hydro records and point out the following:
The officer explained the readings in his evidence and I do not find that the information in the ITO was misleading.
The officer explained that he used the tips that had been received to make the comparisons. The affidavit is to be based on reasonable grounds, not certain knowledge. I am satisfied that the steps that the officer took to investigate and compare the information he had from the Scott property with other properties was reasonable and accurately set out in the ITO.
She concluded that the hydro records showed unusual consumption of electricity on the property as compared with other properties.
 The appellant argues that the issuing justice and the trial judge failed to appreciate the misrepresentations and inaccuracies in these paragraphs. She says the trial judge should have found these paragraphs deficient because Cst. Jarvis did not append the records to the ITO, to permit the justice to make an independent assessment of this information, and discern the fallacies in his reasoning. She points out that Cst. Jarvis conceded at the voir dire that he had no experience in interpreting hydro records, and that he did not know the size of the buildings on the property, or the number, lifestyle, or activities of the occupants. The appellant says without this information his comparisons with other properties were meaningless. As well, his conclusion that the rates were “consistently high” and have “doubled and even tripled” was at odds with Sgt. Lozinski’s more experienced assessment in September 2004 that the records showed only that consumption was “possibly a bit high”. Finally, she argues Cst. Jarvis’ interpretations of the records is misleading because he neglected to say they record consumption over two-month intervals, rather than one month.
 I agree the trial judge does not appear to have appreciated some weaknesses in this part of Cst. Jarvis’ investigation. In particular, Sgt. Lozinski’s opinion in September 2004 cast some doubt on Cst. Jarvis’ interpretations, as did the inconclusive FLIR investigation in December. These demonstrated the consumption of electricity at that time was only perhaps a bit high, and not significant enough to create a heat source visible on FLIR. The electrical records that Cst. Jarvis obtained subsequently did not demonstrate a great deal of variation in consumption in the three buildings over the ensuing months. When Cst. Jarvis decided to submit the ITO on July 19, 2005, the most recent record, dated June 24, 2005, showed consumption of electricity in the cabin and shed was lower than when Sgt. Lozinski had assessed it the previous fall. Cst. Jarvis nevertheless decided the hydro records contributed to a reasonable and probable belief that there was a marihuana grow operation on the property.
 Cst. Jarvis’ failure to include Sgt. Lozinski’s opinion and the inconclusive FLIR test in the ITO, as well as his failure to attach the hydro records to it, precluded the justice and trial judge from properly assessing this aspect of his investigation. In my view, the trial judge should have considered these deficiencies in assessing whether the hydro records supported issuance of the warrant.
 These paragraphs also set out Cst. Jarvis’ comparisons of electrical consumption in the buildings on the appellant’s property with what he believed to be similar buildings elsewhere, and his conclusion that this showed excessive use consistent with a grow operation. I agree with the appellant that the usefulness of this information was limited by the fact that Cst. Jarvis had not seen the buildings on her property, and that he knew nothing of their dimensions, residents, or purpose. I am nevertheless of the view the trial judge was entitled to find the substantial differences in consumption demonstrated by the comparisons of the trailers were suggestive of excessive use of electricity on the appellant’s property.
 In short, I am satisfied that the evidence led on amplification demonstrated weaknesses in these paragraphs of the ITO that do not appear to have been recognized by the trial judge. I nevertheless agree they do provide some limited support.
7. Statements of general knowledge about marihuana grow operations – paragraphs 18 to 20, 22 to 23, and 25 to 26 of the ITO
 Paragraphs 18-20 are set out above. The balance of these paragraphs provides general information about marihuana grow operations based on Cst. Jarvis’ experience, as well as what he says is information he has obtained from “experienced drug investigators”.
 The appellant objects to these as “bald conclusions and boilerplate” and says the trial judge erred in finding it appropriate to consider any of this information in determining whether the warrant could have issued. She says these generalizations are not material facts set out fairly and objectively. Instead, they are prejudicial, misleading, and chosen to create a false impression of her property. She points to Araujo at para. 47, in which Justice LeBel exhorts abhorrence of boilerplate language in an ITO, as it seldom adds anything meaningful and has the potential to trick the reader into thinking the affidavit means something more than it does. As well, she refers to Morelli at paras. 72-74, in which the Court commented adversely on the absence of anything in the ITO to support the expertise of the officers to whom such generalized statements were attributed, as well as the lack of any meaningful factual support for the statements.
 I agree that similar comments could apply to many of the statements in these paragraphs, as well as those that describe the general observations provided by Cst. Stus. Those derived from Cst. Jarvis’ own experience might be unobjectionable, but it is not possible to isolate these. Moreover, as a new recruit it is reasonable to assume he relied heavily on more experienced, and unidentified, sources for much of this information. While the statements appear factual, there is no basis on which to test their reliability or objectivity.
 It is unclear how much reliance the trial judge placed on these statements. In my view, they could not be given significant weight, given the manner in which they were framed in the ITO.
 The trial judge listed the factors she considered in determining the sufficiency of the ITO at paragraph 100 of her decision, set out above at paragraph 17 of these reasons. My review of her decision has produced the following modifications to those factors, which I list in the same numerical order she used:
1. The information from Source A cannot be described as “very accurate”, and has little value as support for the warrant.
2. The trial judge was entitled to rely on the tip from Source B.
3. The information from Cst. Stus is significantly diminished as it was incomplete and, in some cases, consistent with innocent activity.
4. The appellant’s ownership of the property was not disputed.
5.& 8. Little weight can be placed on Cst. Jarvis’ observations on June 6, 2005, and on his generalized statements about marihuana grow operations.
6. The trial judge was entitled to rely on Cst. Jarvis’ surveillance on July 16, 2005 and the fact he smelled marihuana localized to the property on that date.
7. While aspects of Cst. Jarvis’ investigation into the hydro records support a level of suspicion as to high electricity consumption, their weight is diminished due to incomplete reporting and ambiguity.
 I observe that the appellant has not suggested the errors and omissions I have outlined are due to anything other than Cst. Jarvis’ inexperience, and the failure of his senior officers to provide proper supervision. In the circumstances here, the trial judge made no error in finding that the manner in which the ITO came to be in the form in which it was presented to the justice was immaterial in the absence of bad faith or intent to mislead, neither of which was suggested by the defence.
 Given these modifications, it is necessary to address whether the remaining aspects of the ITO, as amplified on review, could support the issuance of the warrant. These are primarily the information from Source B, the detection of the odour of growing marihuana on the appellant’s property on July 16, 2005 and, to a degree, the reports of electrical consumption. The appellant argues forcefully that these factors alone cannot provide reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant is cultivating marihuana on her property.
 I am unable to agree. Source B had demonstrated reliability, and the tip was compelling and ultimately corroborated by Cst. Jarvis’ observations on July 16, 2005 and, to some extent, the pattern of electrical consumption. Most significantly, his detection of the smell of growing marihuana that day amounted to what the trial judge in R. v. Readhead, 2006 BCSC 776, referred to as “the clincher” at para. 174:
... It is obvious that the odour of marijuana is the ultimate positive evidence that a marijuana grow operation is in progress. I agree with Counsel that once the odour is detected, it ties together whatever other information a Constable has gathered, and enables him or her to then apply for a Search Warrant. In layman’s terms, it might be described as “the clincher”.
This Court approved the judge’s reasoning and conclusion.
 In short, although the trial judge’s analysis was flawed in some respects, I am satisfied her errors did not cause prejudice to the appellant or a miscarriage of justice. I would accordingly dismiss the appeal of the ruling on the voir dire.
Was the verdict reasonable and supported on the evidence?
 Appellate review on this question is directed to whether on the whole of the evidence the verdict is one that a properly instructed trier of fact acting judicially could reasonably have rendered: R. v. Mzite, 2011 BCCA 267, 307 B.C.A.C. 70.
 At trial, the Crown led the evidence I have set out in paragraphs 7 to 9 of these reasons. The appellant did not testify. The only issue was whether the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that she had knowledge and control of the marihuana grow operation.
 As to knowledge, the trial judge did not accept the appellant’s statement that, while she was suspicious, she did not know about the marihuana on the other side of the shed. In considering the weight to be given to that statement, the trial judge said:
 A statement given to the police proffered as the evidence of an accused person will be accepted as evidence of that person. However, such a statement cannot be given the same weight as the evidence of a person who testifies before the court. The court cannot, for instance, assess credibility by viewing how the evidence is given. As well, a previously given statement to the police has not been tested by cross-examination and it is not given under oath.
The judge found the appellant had certain knowledge of the grow operation, based on the strong odour of marihuana emanating from the shed.
 As to control of the operation, the trial judge reviewed the circumstantial evidence pointing to the appellant’s involvement in the enterprise and, at several points, commented on the absence of any evidence that could reasonably support an inference other than guilt. She concluded:
 She has provided no explanation as to how these documents came into her possession or how the copy of the grow instructions came to be there. She has also given no explanation as to how the used plant pots got to be on her side of the shed, or what they were to be used for if not the marihuana operation. She has not testified to, nor led any evidence to answer any of the further evidence produced at trial, nor has she produced any documentary evidence to support any of the allegations she made at the time of her arrest.
 At some point the facts cry out for an innocent explanation, a credible believable innocent explanation that is in some way corroborated. No reasonable, credible, or innocent explanation for the incriminating evidence against Ms. Scott has been put before the court. Accordingly, I find the Crown has proved its case and find Judith Scott guilty on both counts.
 The appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, and maintains the trial judge erred in finding the only reasonable inference to be drawn from it was that she had both knowledge and control of the grow operation. She says the judge erred in minimizing the evidentiary value of her statement to the police, and compounded that error by commenting on her failure to testify or produce evidence to support a finding that some other party was responsible for the grow operation.
 While the appellant provides a long list of authorities in which she says similar circumstances led to acquittals, I find these of limited assistance as each case must ultimately depend on its own facts.
 I am not persuaded the verdicts were unreasonable. The odour of marihuana in the shed provided a clear evidentiary basis on which the trial judge was entitled to find the appellant had knowledge of the grow operation.
 The case with respect to control of the enterprise was circumstantial, and relied primarily on the proximity of the grow operation to the appellant’s home and the material related to it that was found in her trailer and on her side of the shed. While the appellant’s statement raised the prospect that another individual controlled the operation, the trial judge was not obliged to accept that evidence. Nor can she be faulted for her observation that absence of an oath or cross-examination limited her ability to test the credibility of the appellant’s statement, and reduced the weight she was prepared to give to it. These are time-honoured considerations in assessing the reliability and credibility of any out-of-court statement, and there is no error in applying them to the statement of an accused.
 As to the trial judge’s comments on the appellant’s failure to substantiate her statement that someone else controlled the grow operation, or to provide an explanation for the material found in her home and shed, the appellant is correct in saying a fact-finder may not use an accused person’s silence to strengthen a case that has not been proven by other evidence. Nevertheless, it is permissible to rely on the failure of an accused to testify in concluding that there is no innocent explanation that would refute the evidence establishing guilt: R. v. Noble,  1 S.C.R. 874 at paras. 85, 87, 114 C.C.C. (3d) 385. In short, silence may be used to confirm guilt, but not to prove it.
 Reading the trial judge’s decision as a whole, I am not persuaded that she improperly used the appellant’s silence to shore up the Crown’s case. She reviewed the circumstantial evidence in detail. She noted the appellant’s statement raised a potential innocent explanation, and expressed concern about the absence of any evidence that might take this beyond speculation. In my view, it is implicit in her conclusion that she found the evidence established the Crown’s case beyond a reasonable doubt and, based on the evidence before her, was unable to conceive of an innocent alternative explanation.
 In any event, this Court is entitled to consider an accused’s silence when determining the reasonableness of a verdict under s. 686(1)(a)(i), and in deciding whether to apply the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii): Noble at paras. 100-101. I am satisfied the circumstantial evidence of the strong odour of marihuana, and the material found in the appellant’s home and shed, provided an evidentiary basis on which the trial judge could properly find that the appellant’s guilt was the only rational inference available.
 The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
“The Honourable Madam Justice Neilson”
“The Honourable Madam Justice D. Smith”
“The Honourable Madam Justice Bennett”