|Amardeep Singh Gill Fruit Growers . This is a slip and fall case. Liability is the only issue|
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
Amardeep Singh Gill
A&P Fruit Growers Ltd.
Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice N. Brown
Reasons for Judgment
 This is a slip and fall case. Liability is the only issue, damages set aside pending this decision. The central question is this: where did the plaintiff fall and hurt himself, on premises owned by the corporate defendant as the plaintiff claims, or at his own home as the defendant claims?
 The plaintiff says that at 1:08 a.m. June 20, 2004 he opened a door in a double wide mobile home, expecting to step outside onto a landing. He describes turning the handle, pushing the door and stepping out, not onto the expected landing and stairs, but into the darkness and thin air, falling over a meter to the ground, which resulted in a compound fracture of his left tibia and fibula.
 The corporate defendant, owner of the 30 acre Abbotsford blueberry farm where the double wide was set up, admits the plaintiff was in the mobile home at the time the plaintiff says, but denies this is the place where the plaintiff fell and injured himself. The defendant called witnesses to testify that the plaintiff suffered his fractures after falling down a set of stairs leading up to a patio at the back of the house (located at Cottonwood Street, Mission, B.C.), where the plaintiff lived with three of the defence witnesses, one of them his sister.
 All the potential eyewitnesses to the fall, in whichever disputed place it happened, are bound by bonds of family or friendship. The plaintiff’s own sister, Jasbir Bath, and the plaintiff’s brother in law Sikander Bath, both testified against him. The only other potential eyewitness, Parmajit Gill, a friend of both Sikander Bath and the plaintiff, testified over a month after I had heard all the other evidence. This delay came about at the defendant’s request because Mr. Gill was out of the country at the time and counsel persuaded me there was due diligence on his part and that Mr. Gill was an important eyewitness for the defence. I therefore granted a continuance. However, when Mr. Gill finally did testify, he did not say what the defence expected him to say, instead, he confirmed the plaintiff’s claim that he had fallen at the double wide, not at home.
 Each party called a biomechanical expert to support their version of events. Their evidence is not pivotal to my final decision, but I will discuss it later below in due course.
 Apart from the obvious question about who speaks the truth about the location of the fall that resulted in the plaintiff’s serious fractures, the defendant raised two evidentiary objections and three defences that I have also to deal with. The first evidentiary objection relates to the Mission Hospital Emergency Admitting Notes, and in particular a notation on the record that states that the plaintiff was injured after a fall from a trailer. The plaintiff alleges this information came from Sikander Bath, who did not deny his presence or provisioning of at least some of the information given to the admitting clerk at the time. I did not admit this record into evidence for reasons given below. The second evidentiary issue relates to cell phone records showing the time that a cell phone call was made by the plaintiff to Sikander Bath, and likewise the times that certain cell phone calls were made by Sikander Bath to his wife Jasbir Bath. These records were produced by Rogers pursuant to a court order upon the plaintiff’s application and at a cost to him of $1,500. These records give the timing of certain calls that the plaintiff, Sikander Bath and his wife admit they made. The timing of these calls is important. I admitted these records into evidence for limited purposes for reasons discussed later in these reasons.
 The defendant also argued, should I accept the plaintiff’s claim that he fell on the defendant’s property, that the plaintiff was there for a recreational purpose, and as such, he was a trespasser, thus resulting in a lower standard of care owed to him by the defendant and in this case arguably met by the defendant. The defendant further argues, the plaintiff’s recreational intention and defendant’s agricultural purposes aside, that the plaintiff did not have the owner’s permission to be on the property: The plaintiff was thus a trespasser and here again the defendant met the required standard of care owed him as a trespasser. If I should reject those arguments, the defendant says that the evidence shows that the plaintiff’s own actions were the cause of his injury, or alternatively he was negligent and that I ought to find a high degree of contributory negligence.
 After an overview of some of the most pertinent evidence, I will set out the reasons for my evidentiary rulings, analyze a segment of the facts in a little more detail, then make my findings on the location of the fall, and conclude with a consideration of the defences raised.
 Besides being the brother in law of the plaintiff, principle defence witness Sikander Bath is also connected to the corporate defendant, since it employs him and his brother, Sukhminder Bath, owns all the company’s shares. Sikander Bath manages the defendant’s blueberry farm and oversees all its day to day operations for him. Defence witness Parmajit Bath worked on the farm too, more or less as a field hand. As noted earlier, the plaintiff and these two men were long time friends. The plaintiff and sole shareholder Sukhminder Bath also knew one another, but not well.
 Parmajit Gill lived part-time in the double wide mobile home, which also served as an office for the farm operation. He lived about half the time on Cottonwood, the other half of the time in the double wide.
 Sikander Bath was responsible for the day to day operation of the farm, and was given a free hand by his brother to run it more or less as he saw fit, although his brother kept a close eye on production costs, with his attention focused on the financial end of the farm operation.
 The plaintiff, Sikander Bath and Parmajit Gill had been at a Cloverdale wedding reception that evening with Sikander’s wife Jasbir Bath and other family and friends. The three men drank throughout the evening and continued on drinking after returning to the double wide trailer situated on the defendant’s farm. The three were experienced drinkers. Jasbir Bath, the plaintiff’s sister and Sikander’s wife, had dropped them off at the farm and then drove herself to the Cottonwood Street Mission home where she and her husband Sikander Bath testified that the plaintiff later fell down the stairs leading up to their backyard patio. It was a short drive home from the Townshipline farm because the farm and their Mission home were not far apart, about a seven to twelve minute drive, with little traffic that time of night.
 I heard considerable evidence and argument about events leading up to the time that the three men were dropped off by Jasbir Bath, mostly concerning routes taken to the farm and the Cottonwood home, who was in which SUV, whether the Hummer was left at the farm after Mrs. Bath left and so on. But there was no controversy that at some point on the return trip from the Cloverdale wedding, passengers switched between the two SUV’s, ending with Jasbir Bath driving the three men - the plaintiff, Sikander Bath and Parmajit Gill, to the Townshipline, Abbotsford farm in a an SUV. As noted already, Jasbir Bath left the men at the farm as they had decided to continue socializing and drinking. I heard some unpersuasive testimony from Mrs. Bath and Sikander Bath about a conversation at the farm that was supposed to show that the men stayed only at the plaintiff’s insistence and that he was not a welcome guest at the farm.
 The heart of this case lies in what happened next. The men drank more whiskey in the double wide trailer set up on the farm. This double wide was used as an office, lunch room/rest area for workers and as part-time residence of Parmajit Gill. Suffice for now to say that the defence theory agrees with the plaintiff that at around 1:08 a.m. the plaintiff called Sikander Bath, who was outdoors at the time, walking to the pump house. Sikander Bath received that 1:08 a.m. call from the plaintiff. He says the plaintiff called in order to tell him they were out of whiskey, so he wanted to go home. The plaintiff agrees that he called Sikander Bath; but says it was in order to tell him that he had just fallen out of the trailer, was hurt and could not get up. Before phoning, he had called out for help, but neither Parmajit Bath or Sikander Bath showed up, so he decided to try reaching Mr. Bath by cell phone. The plaintiff says that after Mr. Bath received the call he and Mr. Gill came by, Sikander Bath and Mr. Gill tried to lift him, but could not because he was too heavy, so Mr. Gill brought a tractor around, lowered the bucket to the ground and the men slid him into it. They then travelled a short distance to a place near the front of the double wide and from there into the back of the Escalade that his sister Jasbir Bath had driven over from Mission to the farm in response to a 1:12 a.m. call made to her by her husband Sikander Bath. The Baths testified that Mrs. Bath had come over to the farm in order to drive the men home; the plaintiff says Mrs. Bath had come over in response to his injury and his need to get to hospital. The only thing the parties agree on here is that Sikander Bath called his wife Jasbir Bath to come to the farm. The plaintiff says he had asked Sikander to call an ambulance but he refused because “there was no blood,” hence the necessity for Mrs. Bath to drive to the farm and take him to hospital.
 There is also no question that Sikander Bath placed a second call to his wife at about 1:24 a.m., 12 minutes after the first call; Sikander Bath said that this call was made to find out where she was. As it turned out, just about the time the call was made, Mrs. Bath told Sikander Bath that she was turning into the farm’s driveway. She drove up the driveway and picked up the three men up, either in no hurry at all because she was there only to take all three home to bed, or more urgently and to the hospital, is the critical question that must be answered in the plaintiff’s favour or see him non-suited.
 The evidence confirmed that it would take about seven to twelve minutes to drive from the farm to Mission General Hospital, depending on traffic conditions and speed: in an emergency situation, with no traffic to contend with that early in the morning, likely less time.
 The Cottonwood home where the plaintiff, Sikander Bath, his wife, and Parmajit Gill lived—at least part of the time—is within about two blocks of the Mission Hospital.
 The defendant contends that the three men and Jasbir Bath drove to Cottonwood. Sikander Bath testified that they were in no hurry since they were just going home to bed. In that case, the trip from the Townshipline farm to Cottonwood could have taken 15 minutes or longer.
 What follows now is an outline of the defendant’s version of events leading up to the plaintiff’s injuries.
 When they arrived at Cottonwood, Mrs. Bath got out of the car and went through the front door. Their three children, her mother and other family had arrived home earlier with Mrs. Bath, who could not have been home very long before receiving 1:12 a.m. call to drive to the farm. Meanwhile, according to Sikander Bath, the three men went around the side of the house to the back, where there was a ground level basement and stairs that led up to an outdoor patio accessible from the house through sliding doors. I do not know why they would not have gone through the front door, Sikander Bath says they did not. Instead, they went along the cement walkway at the front of the house, Parmajit in front, the plaintiff in the middle, with Sikander Bath not far behind.
 The stairs leading up to the patio have seven treads leading up to the deck. The defence theory says that when Parmajit Gill had climbed the stairs and reached the patio and the plaintiff was at the sixth tread, he somehow lost his balance, wobbly because of alcohol the defence theory, caught his foot in the tread, and fell backwards down the stairs. The defence biomechanical expert says that the plaintiff’s left foot was caught at an angle under the tread, and that as the plaintiff fell backward, this created sufficient torsion to fracture his tibia and fibula thus causing a spiral fracture, even before he had hit the cement at the bottom of the stairs. This, at least is the scenario for the mechanism of the injury offered by Dr. Peter Cripton; but it is a mechanism that finds scant support in Mr. Sikander’s eyewitness descriptions of how the fall occurred.
 Jasbir Bath and Sikander Bath then say that the plaintiff got himself up onto his side, somehow propping himself up. Parmajit Gill was then said to have requested a chair from the patio, which Mrs. Bath carried down the stairs. Then, one man on each side, they supported the plaintiff as they walked up the side of the house, prompting one to wonder why they simply did not call an ambulance, considering the pain the plaintiff must have been and the impossibility of weight bearing on the injured leg. Anyway they then managed to get him into the second row seat of the Escalade, where the plaintiff propped himself up with his legs resting on Sikander Bath’s lap. The other self-evident difficulty with this picture of a man on either side of the plaintiff, who had suffered a serious compound fracture, is that Parmajit Gill testified that the plaintiff was injured after falling from the double wide, not down the Cottonwood patio stairs, and so presumably would not have been called upon there to support the plaintiff on the one side.
 The drive to Mission Hospital would not have taken more than a minute or so to reach. There the plaintiff was transferred to a wheel chair and wheeled into emergency, where Sikander Bath testified that he dealt with registration details.
 On the plaintiff’s version during this interval, he would have been driven from the farm directly to Mission Hospital and admitted into care there. At that point, the two narratives join again.
3 EXPERT TESTIMONY ON STANDARD OF CARE AND
1. City of Abbotsford on Standard of Care
 Dale Zahara is a building inspector, and works for the City of Abbotsford. He confirmed that the defendant required a building permit to place the double wide on the farm. The evidence of the lay witnesses confirms it used to be located on a cedar mill, where it had been set up sometime in May 2004. The defendant did not have a building permit for the double wide on the farm. Municipal bylaws require compliance with standards for stairs, handrails and landings.
 He confirmed that safety is the primary concern of municipal building inspectors. He confirmed that the double wide on the farm would not have been approved for use or occupancy without a proper landing in place. If not in place, inspectors usually allow a temporary measure to make sure someone does not open the door and step out and fall to the ground. On a temporary basis only, the owner may be granted a permit if the door has a deadbolt locked from both sides, so that special knowledge or a key would be required to open the door from the inside of the unit. A double bolt is a condition of occupancy.
 The double wide on Townshipline did not confirm with the bylaw as it had no deadbolt. However, in this case, the defendant says that the door in question was (at the time the plaintiff said he opened and walked through it) strapped with two two-by-fours that were placed horizontally across the doors and screwed into the door frame. If that is so, it is obvious that the plaintiff would not have been able to open the door and fall to the ground in the first place, and would make the whole question of standards for securing the door utterly moot. Whether the straps were on the door at the time is part of the larger question of fact for me to decide. If they were not, then the defendant obviously failed to comply with municipal standards. Further, a door unsecured by deadbolts as municipally required or shuttered in some way as the law would require, would leave the premises in an unsafe condition with a foreseeable risk of injury to people, including farm workers using the premises. Whether the defendant is guilty of that negligence depends on other findings with respect to the events on June 20, 2004.
 I heard from two biomechanical experts, Dennis Chimich and Dr. Peter Cripton, both well very qualified to give opinions about the biomechanical aspects of physical injuries. Both witnesses gave their evidence in what I would consider a scientific and professional way, answering questions put to them on cross-examination without evasion.
 They agreed on methodology. They based their opinions on different factual assumptions and so unsurprisingly came to different conclusions.
 Both witnesses describe different kinds of fracture patterns. The patterns the fractured bones exhibit on x-ray and other images can reveal how force was applied to the bone. They then compared the fracture patterns with the forces that would be involved in a fall from the trailer versus the patio stairs on Cottonwood.
 The relevant patterns here are what are referred to as oblique and spiral patterns. These share some similarities. The main distinguishing feature is the way that a spiral fracture wraps around the bone in a spiral pattern. Both experts agree that a spiral fracture requires torsion or a twisting force be applied to the bone, similar to the forces resulting from using a monkey wrench to turn pipe. An oblique fracture involves compression, with axial forces generated up through the bone, although some bending can also be involved. Dennis Chimich assumed that the plaintiff suffered an oblique fracture; Dr. Cripton a spiral fracture.
 Dennis Chimich when first writing his report relied on the opinion of Dr. B. Vaisler, who opined that the plaintiff had suffered a displaced oblique fracture. Dr. Vaisler’s opinion was later buttressed by the November 26, 2008 report of radiologist Dr. P. Munk, prepared in rebuttal to the defence orthopaedic opinion of Dr. P. Guy, which Dr. Cripton relied on. Dr. Munk opined that the fracture was an “oblique fracture of the proximal tibia, not that of classical spiral fracture." Dr. Guy however had opined that the plaintiff's fracture was "a spiral fracture of the proximal tibia with a small amount of combination at the fracture site… caused by a torsional type load which also likely caused the proximal fibula fracture”.
 Dr. Munk’s curriculum vitae reveals very impressive qualifications in his field. He serves in the radiology department at Vancouver General Hospital and on the UBC Faculty of Medicine. He has published very widely, presented, and taught many—including residents in orthopaedics.
 Dr. Guy’s curriculum vitae is also impressive. He is an assistant professor in the faculty of Medicine at UBC and has presented and lectured extensively, though not to the extent of Dr. Munk. He was qualified as an orthopaedic surgeon in 1994.
 Dennis Chimich concluded that the plaintiff’s fracture was consistent with the Townshipline injury scenario, with compression forces applied primarily through the heel of the left leg. He testified that the defendant’s Cottonwood scenario that sees the plaintiff ascending the stairs, losing his balance, falling backward and coming to rest on the concrete pad at the bottom of the stairs would produce 50 to 60% of the amount of energy available at Townshipline. Further, a backwards fall is atypical, because on a stair climb the climber is moving forward, so a slip typically involves a fall forward onto the hands and knees. Further, on Dr. Cripton’s scenario, he would expect to see injury to the head, shoulders and upper back, which were missing in this case, according to both experts. (The plaintiff later on did complain of aches and pains in the neck shoulder and back but neither expert found evidence of obvious injury to these areas following the injury.)
 As noted in the overview, Dr. Cripton assumed a scenario at Cottonwood that sees the plaintiff’s left foot getting hung up between the treads as the plaintiff lost his balance and fell backwards. This would produce the torsional forces necessary to produce a spiral fracture, with the break occurring as the plaintiff fell to the bottom of the “arc of his fall”, and coming to rest at the concrete pad at the bottom of the stairs. Dr. Cripton acknowledged that this is not a typical fall pattern and so he could produce no literature that focused its attention on this type of scenario. He said that the general biomechanical principles of such a fall would nonetheless apply. He acknowledged that one would expect to see back injuries with such a fall, with a significant risk of a fractured neck should the back of the neck strike the edge of a tread.
 Plaintiff’s counsel cross-examined Dr. Cripton about the assumptions he relied on for both scenarios, starting with the fact that he had requested from counsel a radiological opinion upon which to base his opinion, but instead had been provided with an orthopaedic one.
 In examining the plaintiff’s fall of 3 feet 4 inches (1.01 m) from the floor of the double wide to the ground he agreed that he had not taken into account the fact that the plaintiff stated that he did not just step forward past the door sill. In such a typical case as that you would expect his forward momentum to pitch him forward and so see him fall on his knees, as proposed by Dr. Cripton. However, the plaintiff testified that he pushed the door forward and hung onto it as it swung out, from there falling down to the ground, striking the concrete apron that extended 15 inches (0.38 m) from the edge of the wall. This would have involved a more complex set of assumptions and variables unaccounted for in the simpler set of assumptions used by Dr. Cripton.
 Dr. Cripton conceded that while in his opinion the Cottonwood scenario would produce more (torsional) force on the leg and be more likely to produce the spiral fracture he had assumed, the Townshipline scenario, even using his assumptions and estimations, would still produce sufficient force to cause a compression fracture.
 The medical experts themselves were not cross-examined. On the face of the curriculum vitae’s produced and the scope of the opinion required in this case, I find the speciality, qualifications and breadth of experience of Dr. Munk lend more weight to his opinion.
 Mr. Chimich’s opinion is weakened by the fact that he did not conduct an onsite investigation and take his own measurements as Dr. Cripton did. Dr. Cripton’s opinion is weakened by the complex set of facts and conditions he must assume about how the plaintiff atypically fell down the Cottonwood stairs; but that complex scenario would be less problematical for his opinion if it were strongly supported by witness evidence, which does not appear to be the case, or supported by empirical evidence such as bruises, abrasions or other clear identifiers of significant injury to the plaintiff’s back, likewise lacking.
 While the opinions of Mr. Chimich and Dr. Cripton were of some assistance, this case will not turn on either opinion, though of the two, I prefer the opinion of Dr. Chimich for the reasons mentioned.
4 EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
 I turn now to certain evidentiary rulings relating to Rogers cell phone records and the Mission General Hospital emergency admission record in order to decide if I can rely on some of the information contained in them.
a. Cell Phone Records Authentication and Admissibility
 The defendant objected to the admissibility of the Rogers’ cell phone records on the grounds that Mr. De Fehr, a witness called by the plaintiff to explain certain technical aspects of the cell phone records that were produced by Rogers pursuant to court order, could not introduce the records into evidence or attest to their accuracy as a true copy of the original.
 Mr. Buhler also argued that the records could be introduced only pursuant to s. 42 of the Evidence Act, 1996 R.S.B.C. c. 124, business records rule, which requires that the adducing party show that ”they were kept in the usual and ordinary course of business to record in the document a statement of the fact at the time it occurred or within a reasonable time after.” He argues that the plaintiff did not satisfy this requirement. Counsel also submitted that it was not clear whether the records were recorded in Pacific or Eastern Time, or corrected for daylight savings time.
 I reject these submissions for the following reasons.
 Of course a document must be authenticated before it can be admitted into evidence. Here, the cell phone records were received as documents produced by Rogers pursuant to a court order. The records were attached to a cover letter from a Rogers agent who explained that the records were produced in accordance with that order. The records therefore purport to set out every call made at stipulated phone numbers and time periods. Though not attached to a sworn affidavit, the signed letter provides some evidence confirming the authenticity of the records.
 This letter and attached court ordered cell phone records were produced by plaintiff’s counsel, who in his role as agent and as an officer of the court attests to the legitimacy of the letter and its attachments as delivered and received in response to the court order.
 This form of authentication is far from ideal. However, there are other circumstances to consider, including the fact that during the trial defendant’s counsel conceded that the records could be used for the limited purposes of showing that someone at one phone number called another at a certain time:
Mr. Buhler: But we dealt with that. It was an [sic] expert evidence as to what it meant that particular tower dealt with a phone call. All we agreed these records were going to show was that someone called someone at the numbers here at a particular time. [Page 12, Day 2 of Trial]
 As for the need for interpretation of these records by Rogers, these are not records that require expert interpretation. They are clearly labelled “calling number” and “called number”. Further, pertinent sections of these records were put to the witnesses who admitted the cell phone numbers, and did not repudiate the calling time information in them. Generally speaking, they were acknowledged to be “probably” accurate. It should be noted as well that the witnesses could test the accuracy of the information in the records with copies of their own cell phone records if they had concerns about the accuracy of the information.
 Further, the records require no interpretation if utilized for the limited purposes of showing the date and time the calls were made, and from what number and to what numbers and the duration of the calls. Cell phone bills are ubiquitous, and in them one commonly sees the date of a call, the number of the recipient, the duration of the call and the calculated charges, if any. And here, the records are not received to show the location of the caller at the time the calls were made, which was a major concern of counsel: I found Mr. De Fehr’s evidence relating to this both irrelevant and unqualified. Also pertinent is the common knowledge that Rogers, like other cell phone companies, needs to keep a record of the time, duration and recipients of calls in order to justify their billings to customers. I conclude that the records here can be properly utilized to show when someone from one number called another based upon:
a) the fact that the records are generally corroborated by the testimony of witnesses;
b) the fact that the calling records of one number correspond to the receiving records of another with the numbers admitted by the relevant witnesses;
c) the statement of the defendant’s counsel;
d) common knowledge and experience in reading cell phone records;
e) they were produced pursuant to court order and there is sufficient evidence of authenticity in the circumstances.
 With regard to the remaining submissions of the defendant arguing against the admissibility of the cell phone records: It was not clear if all these objections related to the admissibility of the records generally or just to their admissibility for the purpose of showing the location of the caller, (which they cannot be used for in this case). These objections included an argument that without testimony from Rogers we cannot not be sure if the records were corrected for time zones and day light savings time. Not only do these arguments fail to persuade, they are relevant only when considering the weight of the evidence, or the interpretation of the evidence, not when considering their admissibility. Further, the times shown in the bills accords sufficiently with the oral testimony of witnesses about the local times of pertinent events.
 I note that despite the above noted statement by counsel, he still argued against their admissibility on the grounds that they are admissible only under s.42 of the Evidence Act, “whose requirements the plaintiff has not satisfied”. That is not correct. These records can also be admitted as a principled exception to hearsay. As none of the parties seem able to remember with certainty the timing of the relevant calls made, (understandably) that are of importance in this case, the objective evidence provided by the phone records are necessary. As for reliability, the records were produced by a major disinterested corporation pursuant to a court order, and the plaintiff paid Rogers to produce them. As mentioned, it is common knowledge (and common sense) that Rogers must keep accurate call records for its own business needs. The records information was not rebutted by the defendant, despite more than adequate advance notice of their content and tender. Based upon these circumstances, to which can be added the lack of prejudice to the defendant, threshold reliability has been established and the evidence should be admitted for the purposes stated: see R. v. Hall,  B.C.J. No. 2515.
 The above ruling should not be taken as an endorsement of a practice of adducing such records without at least a covering affidavit and imprinted record certification. However, in the circumstances of this case, and for the reasons given, I have admitted them for certain purposes.
b. Mission General Hospital Emergency Records
 The defendant objected to the admissibility of the Mission Hospital emergency admission clinical record sheet. The relevant portions of this sheet are the type written entries in the top left corner of the page, one of them stating that the plaintiff fell from a trailer, just as the plaintiff claims. As noted earlier, Sikander Bath testified that he was present and gave information to the admitting clerk. The plaintiff submits that among the information he gave to the clerk was the location of the fall at the trailer. I should mention here that the attending physician’s handwritten notes in the lower portion of the record also contained a note that the plaintiff fell from a trailer. This was redacted from the document after submissions by counsel, and by agreement. However, the said typewritten portion typed in by the clerk about the location of the fall was not redacted. This may have been due to oversight on the part of the defendant’s counsel in the heat of trial. I would have considered this if so, but given my findings for other reasons, I need not consider that as a reason for also excluding this part of the unredacted section of the record.
 Such a statement [about the location of the fall] would not be hearsay if submitted for the purposes of simply showing that the statement was made. If admitted as such, it could go to the credibility of Sikander Bath’s testimonial loss of memory or any denial he offered about making the statement. However, while plaintiff’s counsel questioned Sikander Bath generally about the making of statements to the admitting clerk, the statement itself and the note about the location of the fall was not squarely put to him.
 This same concern about the failure to put the statement squarely to the witness arises when attempting to adduce this evidence for the truth of its contents. Though I disagree with counsel that this case is similar to Olynyk v. Yeo (1988), 55 D.L.R (4th) 294 (BCCA) and Johnny v. Palmantier, 2005 BCSC 799, it nevertheless would still be highly prejudicial to admit the evidence for this purpose without giving Sikander Bath an opportunity to explain the statement or to deny he was the author, especially considering his evidence that Mr. Gill was also present at the time. It is of course the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893), 6 R. 67 (H.L.) that in such circumstances as these, stands in the way of admission of the statement about the location of the fall for either assessment of credibility or truth purposes. If the cross-examiner intends to impeach the credibility of a witness by means of extrinsic evidence, they must give that witness notice of their intention. See also for a fairly recent case: Aberdeen v. Langley (Township), 2006 BCSC 2064 and s. 14 of the Evidence Act.
 However, this record can be admitted to show the time the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital. For this purpose, the record would be a business record kept in the ordinary course of business and recorded by someone who was under a duty to do so. It could be admitted for this purpose under the business records exemption.
 Defendant’s counsel also raised a concern that there was no evidence that the emergency ward clock used for admission was calibrated to the clock used by Rogers to record the time cell phone calls are made. This is a matter of weight, not admissibility, and regarding weight, common sense suggests that both the hospital and Rogers record keeping would be concerned about accuracy; requiring proof of exact calibration is not reasonable in a trial such as this, especially considering the evidence as a whole before me: Hall at ¶63.
5 FURTHER FACTUAL ANALYSIS
 I heard a fair amount of evidence about alcohol consumption enroute to the wedding reception, at the wedding reception, and after. While of only tangential relevance in deciding the location of the fall, evidence of activities leading up to the alleged fall at the double wide becomes more pertinent when assessing the defence of contributory negligence. I turn now to those events in greater detail.
 As noted, the three men drove the plaintiff’s Hummer to the wedding reception. They stopped at a liquor store in Mission where they bought a forty ounce bottle of Wiser’s Rye Whiskey and a flat of 12 to 18 beers. The plaintiff and Parmajit Gill drank some of this on the way to the Cloverdale wedding reception. They drank more in the parking lot of the reception before going into the hall. I find they also had some drinks from the free bar, and some outside in the Hummer as well. When they left, I doubt any of them would have passed a breathalyser test.
 Jasbir Bath, her mother-in-law, the Bath’s children and some other relatives travelled separately to the reception in their Cadillac Escalade.
 The oral testimony suggests that they all left the reception at the same time. The men were planning on travelling up 176th to the freeway and heading off to Vancouver to party more. So far as can I tell from the evidence, this was nipped in the bud by the mother of one of the younger men who had been hoping to join in with the other older men. As noted earlier, there was a transfer of passengers between SUV’s and the plaintiff, Sikander Bath, and Parmajit Gill were driven to the defendant’s Townshipline farm as outlined earlier.
 I heard estimates of 11:30 a.m., 11:45 a.m. and 11:50 a.m. as the time of arrival at the farm. Cell phone records that I will set out more fully shortly show that the transfer of passengers near the 176th freeway entrance occurred around 11:23 a.m., which was the (recorded) time that a cell phone call was made at the time of the vehicle and passenger change-over. Allowing 40 minutes to travel the distance to the Townshipline farm—just about all highway miles—will take the time to around midnight. Jasbir Bath then, either alone in the Hummer, or in the Escalade with the rest of the group, had about a 10 minute or so drive home.
 The plaintiff testified that the plan was for the three men to go to the farm to continue drinking after their first idea to head into Vancouver was overturned. The plaintiff said when that did not work out, they mutually decided to go to the double wide located on the defendant’s farm. But both Sikander Bath and Jasbir Bath testified that they had stopped off at the farm for no other reason than to drop off Parmajit Gill, and then go home. Sikander Bath said he just wanted to go home with his wife, but the plaintiff kept insisting. He said that he finally said, “What the hell” and decided to go along with it. I note that Jasbir Bath used the identical phrase, “what the hell,” when describing this same conversation. This struck me as odd and not something one would remotely expect to be independently remembered by Mrs. Bath four years later, especially considering her affirmed testimony that she had never discussed this case with her husband.
 I reject the evidence of Sikander Bath and Jasbir Bath about what occurred at the farm drop off. At question 63 of his examination for discovery, Sikander Bath testified:
63 Q The three of you got dropped off at the Townshipline property because you were going to continue to drink at the property?
 I also find it difficult to accept that Sikander Bath needed arm twisting to spend some time with his friends and have a few more drinks. Further, Parmajit Gill confirms the plaintiff’s version.
 The plaintiff testified that he did not know if the forty ounce bottle was gone by the time they arrived at the farm. Parmajit Gill confirmed he had whiskey in the double wide. In any event, there was certainly enough to pour drinks all round and, according to the plaintiff, enough for the final one poured for him in order to reduce the pain he was in after falling and breaking his leg.
 From midnight until some time before 1:08 a.m., which was the time when Sikander Bath said he received the cell phone call from the plaintiff saying he wanted to go home because they were out of whiskey, the three men mostly hung around in the reception area at the south end of the double wide and drank.
 The plaintiff says that Sikander Bath then invited him to look at the new pump house ‘set up’. The new pump house was situated to the east of the double wide, about the distance of the length of the double wide three or four times over. The plaintiff testified that he told Mr. Bath he was not interested in looking at the pump house. In any event, Sikander Bath went outside the double wide on his own. The plaintiff says that Sikander Bath called out again for him to come and join him. (It was a balmy June evening and the windows on the east side of the trailer were likely open, so such a call should have been easy to hear.) This time, the plaintiff says that he decided to join him, but called out to Sikander Bath that he had to use the washroom first. He said that Mr. Bath then told him to come out the back door when he came out. (This would have been the back door that the plaintiff eventually fell from.)
 At this point, Parmajit Gill was in the area of the front office. He gives a slightly different version. He says that the plaintiff was firing off the banger gun out the front door by the office sitting area where the three men had been drinking. But Sikander Bath, according to Parmajit Gill, was worried about the noise the plaintiff was making with the banger gun because there were tenants living on the permanent house located nearby; and so Sikander Bath told the plaintiff to go shoot the gun out the back door instead.
 In either the plaintiff’s or Parmajit Gill’s scenario, the plaintiff then headed down the hallway. The plaintiff testified that he used the washroom, then turned right, heading again down the corridor for the back door, at the opposite end of the double wide from where the office area and front entrance was situated. The plaintiff, whether intending to shoot the banger gun, as Parmajit Gill testified, or to go from there and join Sikander Bath at the pump house, is at this point oblivious to the fact that there were no steps and no landing on the other side of the back door he was soon to open and step through. Neither Sikander Bath or Parmajit Gill said anything to the plaintiff about the fact there was no stairs or landing at the back door, though of course Sikander Bath in the first place denies telling the plaintiff to join him at the pump house, let alone come out the back door. Sikander Bath would not likely have yet reached the pump house at the time that the plaintiff would have fallen at the back door.
 I find it unnecessary to find whether the plaintiff was going out the back door to join Sikander Bath as he says, or to shoot the banger from that location, which is what Parmajit Gill thought. If he had the banger in his right hand, this would have made it more difficult to open the door, but he could have held the banger in his left hand. The plaintiff was not cross-examined on this, presumably because counsel did not expect Mr. Gill to agree with the plaintiff’s version at the time that he cross-examined the plaintiff.
6 FINDINGS ON LOCATION OF THE FALL
 I find that the plaintiff fell from the mobile home and injured himself at the farm on Townshipline. I firmly reject the evidence of all the defence witnesses who testified to the contrary.
.1 Cell Phone Records Support the Plaintiff’s Version
 The objective and circumstantial evidence supports the plaintiff’s version of events. Sikander Bath called his wife at 1:12 a.m. She arrived at the farm just as he was making the second call to her at 1:24 a.m. This means that she arrived at the farm within 12 minutes. Sikander Bath would have no reason to call her back to ask “where are you?” if just awaiting her arrival to pick the men up and drive them home; 12 minutes is well within the expected travel time. However, this quick call back makes more sense if there were some sense of urgency, as there would be if the plaintiff had broken his leg and was in lot of pain.
 Allowing 10 minutes for an urgent drive to the hospital, just down Mission Highway and across the Mission bridge, would place the plaintiff at Mission Hospital sometime around 1:35 a.m. The hospital records indicate registration at 1:37 a.m.
 Sikander Bath indicated that they were not in a hurry to get home; the trip could take 15 to 20 minutes according to him. Allowing 15 minutes, three minutes more than the approximate time it took Mrs. Bath to drive over from Mission, would place them at home on Cottonwood at around 1:45 a.m., 12 minutes after the registration time at the hospital. To this, time needs to be added for getting out of the car, walking to the back of the house, climbing the stairs, falling, fetching a chair for the plaintiff to sit on, helping him around the side of the house, loading him into the SUV and driving to the hospital. Arrival time realistically could not be much earlier than 1:50 a.m. The table below, based on the times contained in the Rogers records and the factual assumptions noted, compares the two scenarios and confirms that a fall at Cottonwood does not fit with the time available to arrive at the hospital by 1:37 a.m.
 Mr. Buhler went through a similar analytical exercise and came up with an elapsed time very close to these calculations. He argued that there could be errors in the emergency record admission times, and that time the difference between the two theories was not that great. However, this overlooks the fact that it would have taken a considerable amount of time for the plaintiff to walk down the side of the Cottonwood house to the SUV—assuming he was even capable of doing so. These assumptions are generous to the defendants’ case.
 As far as credibility is concerned, I found Sikander Bath when giving his testimony was evasive, contradictory, argumentative, quibbled over non-essentials and I did not find him to be a credible witness. For example, Sikander Bath testified at trial that when he was at the bottom of the stairs he had looked up and then saw the plaintiff for about 10 seconds, saw him twist his leg into the thing (‘the thing’ most likely referring to the space between the treads). He also said that the plaintiff broke his leg when he landed on the concrete pad at the bottom of the stairs. However, on examination for discovery, he testified:
366Q: I am not talking about time. I am talking about what you saw. What did you –
A Sir, what I am telling you is this is what I saw. The guy fell right in front of me and he landed on his leg and then that’s it.
367Q Let’s back up a bit.
A Okay, let’s back it up.
368Q You are staying there. You are watching two people walk to the top of the stairs, correct?
369Q That’s yes?
A I was probably watching or watching the sky.
370Q Well, it’s night time?
A Well, it don’t matter. I don’t have to watch people.
371Q Now, you are there star-gazing; is that what you are telling me?
A Maybe I don’t have to watch people. You are forcing me to watch people.
372Q I am asking you whether you were.
A I don’t remember four years if I was watching, but all I know is he fell in front of me.
395Q And describe how he landed on the sidewalk as you saw it?
A On one of his leg. I don’t even know which leg he did break, left or right.
396Q I am asking you what you saw.
A I just saw he dropped on one side and he said – holding his legs he said he broke his leg.
 I find Sikander Bath’s evidence that Mrs. Bath was called to pick the men up not much more than one half hour after being dropped off because they had run out of whiskey, and that he would call his wife back again just twelve minutes later to see what was keeping her, is not believable.
 I also find that Mrs. Bath’s evidence was not credible. She clearly was not happy to be testifying in this case. She ignored the terms of a Rule 28 examination order made November 7, 2007 by Master Keighley and her explanation for her failure to attend the January 16, 2008 substituted date was unconvincing. She denied discussing the case with anyone before testifying, while at the same time gave the impression of following a scripted version of events when the topic related to the supposed Cottonwood fall. I have little confidence in Mrs. Bath’s evidence and reject completely her account of events onCottonwood.
 As mentioned, the defendant intended to call Parmajit Gill to testify, and I adjourned the trial in order to afford the defendant an opportunity to call him as a witness. However, to the defendant’s surprise and mine, his testimony supported the plaintiff’s version of events. I allowed counsel to cross-examine Mr. Gill, but he was unshaken. Mr. Gill, who testified through an interpreter, was shown a copy of an affidavit sworn January 8, 2008 in Mr. Buhler’s office, with statements therein placing the location of the fall on Cottonwood. Mr. Gill testified that Sikander Bath acted as an interpreter at the time, did not explain the contents of the affidavit, and just told him to sign it. He said the statement in it that the plaintiff had fallen on Cottonwood did not come from him. Mr. Buhler in cross-examination asked Mr. Gill to agree that there were others present at the time, intimating they also spoke Punjabi, but Mr. Gill did not confirm this to be so. No witnesses were called in rebuttal. Mr. Buhler suggested to me in argument that Mr. Gill’s English was better than he let on, but I note that he was called by the defence, who presumably arranged the interpreter. Mr. Buhler submitted that Mr. Gill knew what was going on and what he had been asked to sign, intimating others were present. Of course, counsel is placed in an impossible position in such circumstances. As stated in court, counsel did nothing wrong here: it is not always necessary or possible to cross and dot every preparatory “t” and “i” when gathering witness statements for a case such as this; usually statements are just signed off, not sworn, as here. However, Sikander Bath’s rejected evidence, his authority over Mr. Gill and the failure to certify the translation through an official court interpreter taints the reliability of the out of court statement in this case; and I am more than reluctant in the circumstances to regard this as a prior inconsistent statement.
 I note that Mr. Gill’s evidence did not dovetail with the plaintiff’s evidence in all particulars, for example his recollection that the plaintiff was going to the back of the double wide in order to shoot the banger gun differs. Similarly, he minimized Sikander Bath’s involvement in the banger gun shooting. He also introduced elements to some of the events that only an eyewitness would recall, such as going outside the trailer and walking along the front of it, looking for the plaintiff because he had not heard the banger gun going off for a few minutes. His description of his conversation when he met up with Sikander Bath outside the double wide conveyed the richer sense and sequencing of an eye witness account. I note as well that Sikander Bath was the witness’s boss and that he was friends with both the plaintiff and Sikander Bath. Nonetheless, I do accept his evidence with some caution, though a caution somewhat tempered in that it does conform largely with other accepted evidence.
 The defendant also called Manjit Khangura, who has so far gone unmentioned in these reasons. The defendant called him as a supervisor at the farm, employed by the defendant. He was not at the reception nor an eyewitness to the plaintiff’s fall. No mention on his direct was made of his close relationship over 10 years with Sikander Bath. On cross-examination, the plaintiff admitted he was co-accused with Sikander Bath in criminal proceedings relating to GST fraud. Questioning on this issue was allowed, not touching the issue of character or honesty, but as evidence of the at first unmentioned close association between the witness and Sikander Bath. He acknowledged that he had been told all the details of the party, the drinking, the fall down the Cottonwood stairs etc. offering details, as Mr. Cope pointed out, not as well recalled by Sikander Bath.
 Mr. Khangura was called principally to show that when he was at work the early morning following the plaintiff’s fall, he had noticed that the planks that had been used to board up the door (well before the plaintiff’s fall) were still in their usual place. I find it highly improbable he would have taken any notice of a condition that had supposedly been in place for weeks and when the circumstances and timing of events warranted the witness no reason at all to pay attention to the condition of the door (especially while driving a tractor around 30 acres of berries or alternatively doing paper work in the double wide office).
 Likewise unbelievable is his evidence that when the plaintiff attended on the farm a couple of months later and asked him to remove the planks (by that time nailed against the door to prevent access) in order for the plaintiff to take pictures of the door he had fallen through, the witness said that he did not know the reason for the plaintiff asking him to doing this. He just did it as requested. The plaintiff had testified that Sikander Bath was present at the time and authorized removal of the planks, though Sikander Bath denied this. I find it likely that Sikander Bath was present at the time and authorized the removal of the doors; but this is not a necessary finding to my rejection of Mr. Khangura’s evidence here. It would strain common sense to the breaking point to accept either that Mr. Khangura would have demonstrated such a singular lack of curiosity about the reasons for removing the planks or that he would have done so without some authorization or explanation. I reject Manjit Khangura’s evidence.
 I find that the door was not boarded up the night that the plaintiff opened it and fell to the ground. It was boarded up after this incident and I find the witness evidence about seeing it boarded up the day following the fall a complete fabrication.
 I have considered the evidence of Iqbal Gill. Nothing in his testimony alters to any extent my conclusion that the plaintiff fell from the double wide.
 Defendant’s counsel identified various contradictions and minor discrepancies in the plaintiff’s evidence. I have considered them and counsel’s able submissions, but none of them give me cause to alter my conclusions on the question of the location of the fall. The plaintiff’s evidence on the weightier issues was not significantly shaken on cross-examination.
 I find that that the plaintiff fell out of the back door of the double wide, which had no deadbolt, neither was it boarded up to prevent egress by anyone. The stairs and landing had been removed earlier for whatever reason of convenience or simply not yet put up. Neither Parmajit Gill or Sikander Gill, on the evidence before me, warned the plaintiff about the danger. No signs were posted in the unit.
 I find that the plaintiff was an invited and welcome guest of Sikander Bath and Parmajit Gill at the material time.
7 LEGAL ISSUES
 Defendant’s counsel argued that if I should find that the plaintiff fell on the defendant’s farm, it met the requisite lower standard of care owed the plaintiff imposed by the Occupier Liability Act in these circumstances. Defendant’s counsel argues that the plaintiff was engaged in a recreational activity on lands and premises that were used for agricultural purposes: see s. 3(3.2)(b) of the Occupier Liability Act, 1996 R.S.B.C. c. 337. He further argues that the defendant was a trespasser because he was on the premises uninvited by any authorized person without reasonable grounds for believing that either Sikander Bath or Parmajit Gill had authority to allow him on the lands and premises in the circumstances. I will deal with the ‘recreational argument’ first.
.1 Recreational Use and Occupier Liability
 The Occupiers Liability Act, can potentially lower the duty of care placed on owners:
(3) Despite subsection (1), an occupier has no duty of care to a person in respect of risks willingly assumed by that person other than a duty not to
(a) create a danger with intent to do harm to the person or damage to the person's property, or
(b) act with reckless disregard to the safety of the person or the integrity of the person's property.
 This lower standard of care is applied only in limited circumstances. The sections relevant to this case are reproduced below:
3(3.2) A person who enters any of the categories of premises described in subsection (3.3) is deemed to have willingly assumed all risks and the occupier of those premises is subject only to the duty of care set out in subsection (3) if
(a) the person who enters is trespassing, or
(b) the entry is for the purpose of a recreational activity and
(i) the occupier receives no payment or other consideration for the entry or activity of the person, other than a payment or other consideration from a government or government agency or a non-profit recreational club or association, and
(ii) the occupier is not providing the person with living accommodation on those premises.
(3.3) The categories of premises referred to in subsection (3.2) are as follows:
(a) premises that the occupier uses primarily for agricultural purposes;
 The purpose of these sections was considered in Skopnik v. BC Rail Ltd., 2008 BCCA 331. In Skopnik, the court adopted the comments of the court in Hindley v. Waterfront Properties Corp., 2002 BCSC 885 (at ¶19 and ¶22). In Hindleythe court explained that the amendments to the Occupiers Liability Act , which include s.3(3.2)(b), were made for the purpose of recognizing that a normal duty of care would be too onerous on rural owners, who cannot reasonably be expected to monitor all their land in order to ensure that it is reasonably safe.
 The amendments were made in order to lower the standard of care owed to outdoor recreationalists such as recreational bicyclists and ATV riders. The court in Skopnik recounted:
90. As detailed in the reasons of Mr. Justice Bauman, section 3(3.3) was added to the Act in 1998 in response to calls for reform by outdoor recreationalists who were willing to assume the risk of hazards in return for being allowed greater access. This was commented upon by the Honourable C. McGregor when introducing the amendment for second reading:
In planning the route for the Trans Canada Trail, government and community groups encountered a longstanding issue in British Columbia. Fear of liability is causing landowners to restrict recreational access to their properties. In the context of the Trans Canada Trail, this means that private land owners are reluctant to allow recreational trail use of their land and that local communities are hesitant to assume full responsibility for managing local portions of the trail.
Amendments to the Occupiers Liability Act will help to resolve these problems by lowering the duty of care owed to non-paying recreationalists on recreational trails and certain classes of undeveloped lands. These amendments more equitably balance the duty of care between occupiers and the non-paying recreationalists …
(British Columbia, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative Assembly (Hansard), Vol. 9, No. 16 (11 May 1998) at 7681)
 The purpose of s. 3(3.2)(b) establishes that the intentions of the plaintiff in this case may have been “recreational” within an ordinary meaning of that word, but not within the meaning intended by the Occupiers Liability Act. The position of the plaintiff is not at all like that of an ATV driver riding on a large tract of agricultural land, and far more like that of a guest, with the analysis of the duty of care guided more by social host liability and obligations.
 It is important to note that the recreational activity provision can apply both when a plaintiff is invited by the owner and when not invited. Its real significance lies in those circumstances where the landowner invites the plaintiff, for example, to snowmobile on a large tract of land—when, though invited, he is still owed no higher duty than that owed to a trespasser. On the other hand, if a plaintiff were uninvited, hence a trespasser, the inquiry need go no further, the plaintiff is likewise a trespasser, the occupier required only to meet the lower standard of care: see s. 3(3.3)(a).
 To accept the defendant’s rough hewn interpretation of this section would lead to seeing hosts living on a Chilliwack farm released from the standards that would be imposed on them if hosting their guests in a Coal Harbour condominium. It would make no difference at all if the Chilliwack farmhouse stairs the guests were invited to climb were as rotten as a year old pumpkin, so long as the host lived on land used for agricultural purposes. This cannot be the intended result of the legislation.
 Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal in Skopnik found that s. 3.2 was drafted in response to organizations representing outdoor recreational users, explaining that their constituents would be willing to accept a lower standard of care for greater access to rural areas. As the legislation was drafted in response to this plea, one can only conclude that it was intended for the broad range of “recreational uses” covered by such organizations. Broad though this range might potentially be, attending at a location on the invitation of an owner cannot reasonably be considered the type of recreational activity intended by the section.
.2 Trespasser Argument
 Mr. Buhler referred me to Skopnik, which for the purposes of this case simply affirms that at common law and likewise for the purposes of s. 3(3.2)(a) of the Occupiers Liability Act, a person is a trespasser if on lands and premises without permission. A person’s honest belief that they are not trespassing is not a defence. The Trespass Act, 1996 R.S.B.C. c. 462, on the other hand, requires enclosures around premises or the posting of signs around them.
 Counsel then argues that the owner of the farm was the corporate defendant and that permission to enter the property could come only from a duly authorized representative of the corporate defendant, and that the plaintiff’s honest belief that he had permission to enter the farm does not matter.
 He further pointed out that: at the examination for discovery the plaintiff could not identify the owner of the property, so could not know who had authority to allow him entry; that the actual owner did not invite him onto the property; that Parmajit Gill did not have authority to invite the plaintiff onto the farm; that Sikander Bath did not have the authority, and the plaintiff had no reasonable basis for believing that he had it, since he did not know the identity of the owner.
 The first flaw in this argument is its failure to acknowledge the fact that the act is the Occupiers Liability Act, not the “Owners Liability Act”, as well as the fact that there may be more than one occupier. The Occupiers Liability Act defines “occupier” as follows:
An “occupier” means a person who
(a) is in physical possession of premises, or
(b) has responsibility for, and control over, the condition of the premises, the activities conducted on those premises and the persons allowed to enter those premises,
and, for this Act, there may be on occupier of the same premises.
 The plaintiff argued that the defendant is negligent, based upon the invitation and direction of Sikander Bath, who was authorized to do so by the corporate defendant, into a dangerous situation. Though not plead or specifically argued, this situation is one that is provided for by s. 6 of the Occupiers Liability Act.
6(1) If premises are occupied or used under a tenancy under which a landlord is responsible for the maintenance or repair of the premises, it is the duty of the landlord to show toward any person who, or whose property, may be on the premises the same care in respect of risks arising from failure on the landlord's part in carrying out the landlord's responsibility, as is required by this Act to be shown by an occupier of premises toward persons entering on or using the premises.
(2) If premises are occupied under a subtenancy, subsection (1) applies to a landlord who is responsible for the maintenance or repair of the premises comprised in the subtenancy.
(3) For the purposes of this section
(a) a landlord is not in default of the landlord's duty under subsection (1) unless the default would be actionable at the suit of the occupier,
(b) nothing relieves a landlord of a duty the landlord may have apart from this section, and
(c) obligations imposed by an enactment in respect of a tenancy are deemed to be imposed by the tenancy.
(4) This section applies to all tenancies.
 A tenancy includes a statutory tenancy, an implied tenancy, and any contract conferring the right of occupation, and “landlord” must be construed accordingly: see s. 1 of the Occupiers Liability Act.
 According to accepted evidence, Parmajit Gill lived in part of the double wide part of the time. He was authorized to do so by Sikander Bath, who was responsible for the day to day operation of the whole farm, and for all practical day to day purposes was in physical possession of it. Sukhminder Bath had very little involvement in the day to day operations, including rental of the permanent house on the farm, which was rented out to tenants by Sikander Bath. He also confirmed that his brother Sikander Bath made all the arrangements for removal of the double wide from its former site at a saw mill to the farm—indeed the move was carried out by Sikander Bath without any prior discussion or authorization. In fact, Sukhminder did not even know that the double wide was on the farm until after service of the writ of summons on him in August 2005, two years later. He did not know a building permit was required, and did not instruct his brother to make inquiries, leaving this up to Sikander Bath as “manager of the farm.” He had very little social contact with his brother and had never visited his house. He was unaware of his social activities.
 Given this evidence, Sukhminder Bath’s evidence that he did not give permission to his brother to invite someone to the double wide to socialize rings hollow, given that he had so little physical involvement with the farm operations that he did not realize for two years there was even a double wide on the farm. While Sukhminder Bath may have had financial oversight, it is clear that he had ceded managerial control, and for all practical purposes, physical possession of the farm and physical operations on it almost entirely to Sikander Bath.
 I reject the submission that in the circumstances Sikander Bath did not have authority to invite the plaintiff onto the farm for social purposes. The plaintiff was therefore not a trespasser and the defendant owes him the legislated standard of care owed an invitee; and nothing further is required of the plaintiff.
 But in addition, and referring now back to s. 6 of the Occupiers Liability Act, I find that both Sikander Bath and Parmajit Bath may be considered as a tenant with a right of occupancy: in the case of Sikander Bath in his capacity of farm manager in physical possession of the farm, including the double wide, and Parmajit Gill in his capacity as an employee with a right of part-time residency in the double wide inherent to his status as an employee with those specific duties assigned him by Sikander Bath.
 The defendant, as owner of the lands and premises and employer of Sikander Bath and Parmajit Gill is ultimately responsible for the repair and maintenance of the premises; and a duty of care is owed to its tenants.
 The Occupiers Liability Act extends this duty to “any person” that “may be on the premises”. This ‘extension’ of course must be read subject to the right of an occupier to show a lower standard of care to trespassers, else that provision would be nullified. Therefore, s.6 of the Occupiers Liability Act extends the duty of care owed by a landlord to its tenant to any ‘invitee’ of those tenants.
 In all events, in the circumstances of this case, I find that Sikander Bath had authority to invite the plaintiff into the double wide to socialize, as did Parmajit Gill, and that it would be reasonable on the part of the plaintiff to assume that Sikander Bath possessed this authority; and I find that the plaintiff was not a trespasser in the circumstances of this case. Further, I have found that the cooperate defendant failed in its duty to take the care that in all the circumstances of this case was reasonable to see that a person in the double wide would be reasonably safe using it. Such default and liability, as here, would be actionable by the occupiers Parmajit Gill and Sikander Bath, and by operation of s.6 this liability extends to the plaintiff in this case.
 I note that incidentally the fact that the negligence of the corporate defendant would involve the non misfeasance and misfeasance of employee Sikander Bath would not be a defence to the plaintiff’s action. And were Sikander Bath to bring such an action himself, the defendant would have a ready and very strong answer to such action in contributory negligence. In any event, the requirements of s. 6(3)(a) need not be read in such a literal sense. Further, I note that Parmajit Gill, also a tenant of the defendant, could also bring such an action.
 I note also that it was open to the defendant to join Sikander Bath as a Third Party in this action, alleging breach of authority, likewise for the plaintiff to join Sikander Bath and Parmajit Gill as occupiers, who might theoretically then have joined the defendant as an occupier and/or made claims as employees for indemnification. However, this case can be decided, as constituted here, within the four corners of the Act.
c. Liability on the Ordinary Standard of Care
 The defendant submits that even on the ordinary standard of care, it escapes liability, referring me to Wilde v. Cambie Malone Corp. 2008 BCSC 704 and guiding principles for the establishment of liability as laid down by Martinson J.
- the defendant’s failure to act must be a breach of the defendant’s positive duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the plaintiff was reasonably safe when using the premises;
- the duty does not extend so far as to require removal of every possibility of danger, perfection is not required;
- it must be proven that the unsafe condition actually caused the accident in question.
 The above tests are well met in this case. Had the defendant taken the reasonable care exemplified by the municipal inspection standards, the plaintiff would not have fallen. Further, I reject the defendant’s argument that the accident was not foreseeable on the basis that the premises were intended to be used during day light business hours only. This accident could have just as easily occurred in daylight business hours with a farm worker in for a noon hour lunch leaving in a hurry and distractedly rushing out the door and falling in the same way as the plaintiff. Further, it is trite law that the precise nature of the harm that has unfolded need not be foreseen; only the reasonable possibility of harm and in a general way. I find that the duty of care, and the standard of care, and the breach of it are all well proven on the evidence in this case.
d. Contributory Negligence
 Occupiers are entitled to assume that persons using their premises will exercise reasonable care for their own safety: Fryer v. Beta Theta Pi Alumni Assoc. of British Columbia,  B.C.J. No. 1968 (S.C.).
 It is clear from the evidence that the plaintiff consumed a great deal of alcohol throughout the day. While he testified that he was able to walk down the double wide hallway without difficulty, he also acknowledged that he was too intoxicated to drive a vehicle. Defendant’s counsel referred me to the following cases where the plaintiff was found partially responsible for his injuries on account of intoxication:
(a) Cretien v. Jensen (1998), 58 B.C.L.R. (3d) 186;
(b) Cooper v. Spectra Food Corp,  B.C.J. 2297;
(c) Peters v. A.B.C. Boat Charters Ltd (1992), 73 B.C.L.R. (2d) 389;
(d) Niblock v. Pacific National Exhibition (1981), 30 B.C.L.R. 20.
 The defendant submits as well that the plaintiff did not look before stepping out the trailer door and referred me to the following cases where a plaintiff was found at fault in varying degrees for failing to look where they were going:
(a) Macrae v. Peterson, Stark and Fowler,  B.C.J. No. 1898;
(b) Pilon v. Joe Webber Pontiac Buick GMC Ltd.,  B.C.J. No. 2664;
(c) Castillo v. Westfair Foods Ltd. (c.o.b. Real Canadian Superstore),  B.C.J. No. 1326.
 In this case I note that the plaintiff was not warned off about the absent landing and stairs, a failure that would not be completely unexpected given the inebriated states and the depressed state of vigilance and care that usually follows. Further, as Mr. Cope pointed out for the plaintiff, the door opened outwards, and there was no light. I am not sure that this assists the plaintiff that much however; he knew he was going outside. Nonetheless the fact he was not warned off, and indeed was told to either exit that door—or shoot the banger from it on Parmajit Gill’s version—are mitigating factors in apportioning blameworthiness on this aspect. All aside, just a modicum of care would have cautioned the plaintiff to check before stepping out into the darkness without any hesitation at all.
 This is a question of relative blameworthiness. I find the plaintiff contributorily negligent. I apportion fault, with the defendant bearing 70%, the plaintiff bearing 30%.
“Mr. Justice N. Brown”